Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Volume 52
Issue 3 May 2019

Article 6

2019

Regulating Corruption in Intercountry Adoption
Jordan Bunn

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl
Part of the Family Law Commons, International Humanitarian Law Commons, and the Transnational
Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jordan Bunn, Regulating Corruption in Intercountry Adoption, 52 Vanderbilt Law Review 685 (2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol52/iss3/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For
more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

Notes:
Regulating Corruption in
Intercountry Adoption
ABSTRACT

The current regulatory system for intercountry adoptionhas failed
parents, children, and governments. Impoverished parents and
children have been exploited by crooked adoption agencies, orphanage
directors, and bureaucrats looking to profit from well-meaning
prospective parents who will pay significant fees in order to adopt.
While the 1993 Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and
Cooperationin Respect of Intercountry Adoption lays a good foundation
for catching and eliminating this corruption, it has not been fully
implemented in many developing countries that lack the necessary
resources and infrastructure. Some critics want to give up on or
significantly modify the Hague Convention's framework. However, the
best way to see the principles of the Hague Convention realized and to
deter corruptpractices is to shift some of the administrativeburden in
intercountry adoption to the better-resourced receiving states.
Specifically, this Note recommends that receiving states should have
more power to monitor the operations in less developed sending states
and to act unilaterallywhen they detect corruption.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Throughout its relatively brief history, intercountry adoption has
been the subject of much praise, criticism, and general controversy.'

See HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT'L L., THE 1993 HAGUE CONVENTION ON
1.
PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AND CO-OPERATION IN RESPECT OF INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION:
INFORMATION BROCHURE 4 (2012), https://assets.hcch.net/upload/brochure33en.pdf
[https://perma.ce/2PPZ-2J7N] (archived Feb. 13, 2019) [hereinafter INFORMATION
BROCHURE] ("By the 1980s, it was recognised that this phenomenon was creating serious
and complex human and legal problems . . . ."); Elizabeth Bartholet, International
Adoption: Propriety, Prospects and Pragmatics, 13 J. AM. ADAC. MATRIM. LAW. 181,
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Proponents of intercountry adoption view it as an opportunity for
hopeful parents and children to mutually benefit, rather than each
waiting-perhaps indefinitely-to be matched from within the smaller
pools of available children or parents in their own countries. 2
Additionally, the building of cross-cultural families is viewed as a
positive for the parents and children involved and for society more
generally.3
On the other hand, critics view transnational adoption as further
entrenching unhealthy power dynamics between wealthier countries
and developing countries. 4 Corrupt adoption practices in the poorer
sending countries have fortified this narrative. More and more
allegations have arisen in recent decades suggesting that many of the
infants and toddlers adopted through intercountry-adoption processes
were not actually orphaned children in need of a home.5 Instead, many
of these children were made "adoptable" by financial incentives
targeting destitute parents or by trafficking, kidnapping, or forced
pregnancy. 6 Journalist E.J. Graff has gone as far as to suggest that
"many international adoption agencies work not to find homes for
needy children but to find children for Western homes."7 The current
challenge in regulating intercountry adoption is finding a system that
eliminates corruption but does not unnecessarily hinder adoptions.
The aim of this Note is to discuss practical ways the current
regime can better embody the principles set forth in the international
conventions governing adoption. With this objective in mind, this Note
offers pragmatic criticism of some of the more prominent proposals
without evaluating the numerous theoretical positions often associated
with the subject.8 Part II briefly describes the development of

182-83 (1996) [hereinafter Bartholet, Propriety, Prospects and Pragmatics] (outlining
common criticisms and positive views of international adoption).
2.
See Bartholet, Propriety, Prospects and Pragmatics, supra note 1, at 183
(discussing the positive views of international adoption).
3.
See id.
4.
See id. at 182 (discussing the criticisms of international adoption). This view
is especially understandable in light of how international adoptions tend to play out: a
wealthy, Western family-often a white family-adopts a child from an impoverished
area of a developing country-often a child of color-and brings the child "home" to be
raised according to the lifestyle and traditions of the adoptive parents. Id.
5.

See D. MARIANNE BLAIR ET AL., FAMILY LAW IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 824

(3d ed. 2015) ("Many argue that the increased interest in transnational adoption and the
instances of trafficking are no longer isolated, but instead have become endemic to the
institution."); E.J. Graff, The Lie We Love, FOREIGN POLICY (Oct. 6, 2009, 5:14 PM),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/06/the-lie-we-love/
[https://perma.cc/4ZQZ-L87M]
(archived Feb. 13, 2019) [hereinafter Graff, The Lie We Love] (noting many of the infants
and toddlers being adopted are not in need of adoption).
6.
See Graff, The Lie We Love, supra note 5 ("As international adoptions have
flourished, so has evidence that babies in many countries are being systematically
bought, coerced, and stolen away from their birth families.").
7.
Id.
8.
Several scholars have written in response to the abuses that have occurred in
intercountry adoption. Much of the discussion has been concerned with interpreting
general child and human rights principles to determine whether they mandate more or
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intercountry adoption and the international instruments that seek to
regulate it. Part III takes a deeper look at the patterns of corruption
that have played out in intercountry adoption, using Guatemalan and
Ethiopian adoptions as case studies for greater insight into the
problem. Part IV analyzes some of the shortcomings of the current
international framework, as well as some of the existing policy
proposals for overcoming them. Specifically, it critiques existing
proposals that suggest a total abandonment of the current framework
as well as those that call for new systems that would increase the
administrative burden on all already overburdened groups. Finally,
Part V suggests that, to best reduce corruption, the wealthier
developed countries in the intercountry-adoption system should take
on more responsibility in monitoring and increasing transparency in
intercountry adoptions.

II. THE RISE OF INTERCOUNTRY

ADOPTION AND INTERNATIONAL

ATTEMPTS TO REGULATE IT

A. A Brief History of IntercountryAdoption
Intercountry adoption first developed in Western countries
following World War II as a way to meet the needs of children who were
9
lost or separated from their families during the war. The United
Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) International Child Development
Center has referred to those early periods of intercountry adoption as
"an ad hoc humanitarian response to the situation of children orphaned
by war." 10 In the earlier years, people chose international adoption in
furtherance of altruistic, humanitarian, and missionary efforts
following global crises."

less intercountry adoption. See generally, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, International
Adoption: The Human Rights Position, 1 GLOB. POL'Y 91 (2010) [hereinafter Bartholet,
Human Rights]; Sara Dillon, Making Legal Regimes for Intercountry Adoptions Reflect
Human Rights Principles:Transforming the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
the Child with the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption, 21 B.U. INT'L L.J. 179
(2003); David M. Smolin, Intercountry Adoption and Poverty: A Human Rights Analysis,
36 CAP. U. L. REV. 413 (2007) [hereinafter Smolin, Poverty]. This note does not purport
to add to that discussion.
See BLAIR ET AL., supra note 5, at 803 ("Intercountry adoption developed in
9.
the United States and other western nations following World War II to address the needs
of children orphaned or displaced by the war and its aftermath."); PETER CONN,
ADOPTION: A BRIEF SOCIAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY 116 (2013) (telling the history of the
first interracial intercountry adoption agency); Barbara Stark, When Genealogy Matters:
Intercountry Adoption, International Human Rights, and Global Neoliberalism, 51
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 159, 174 (2018) ("International adoption began after World War
II in the United States with Pearl S. Buck's big-hearted project to save children in a
chaotic, desperately poor, post-war China.").
Dawn Watkins, Intercountry Adoption and the Hague Convention: Article 22
10.
and Limitations upon Safeguarding, 24 CHILD & FAM. L.Q. 389, 390 (2012).
See CONN, supra note 9, at 116-17 (discussing some of the earlier advocates
11.
of intercountry adoption and the sources of their motivation); see also BLAIR ET AL., supra
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The number of intercountry adoptions steadily rose in the decades
following World War II, increasing significantly in the 1990S. 1 2 The
period leading up to and during the 1990s saw an increase in both the
number of parents looking to adopt and the number of adoptable
children.1 3 The rise in Western demand is largely associated with
societal changes that took place in the 1960s. 14 For one thing, increased
access to contraception and abortions reduced unplanned pregnancies
in Western countries.' 5 Additionally, more prospective parents were
looking to adopt as more women delayed having children to the point
of outwaiting their fertility.1 6 The increase in adoptable children is
likely tied to China opening its doors to intercountry adoption in 1992,
coupled with the surplus of adoptable children in China as a result of
its one-child policy enacted in 1979.17 The increase is also tied to the
number of children who were orphaned during the AIDS crisis. 18 In
2004, over forty-five thousand children were adopted via intercountry
adoption.' 9

note 5, at 824 (noting that "most international adoption facilitators prior to the mid1980s were philanthropic or missionary organizations").
12.
See BLAIR ET AL., supra note 5, at 803 (discussing the reasons for the increase
in adoptions in the 1990s); CONN, supra note 9, at 112-13 (discussing the rise of
adoptions).
13.
See Jessica L. Singer, Intercountry Adoption Laws: How Can China's OneChild Policy Coincide with the 1993 Hague Convention on Adoption?, 22 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 283, 283 (1998) ("The number of international adoptions world-wide
has increased dramatically in the past fifty years."); Watkins, supra note 10, at 390-91
(discussing the increase in international adoptions); see also BLAIR ET AL., supra note 5,
at 803 (saying the increased desire of western families to adopt internationally, together
with conditions in developing nations, prompted greater willingness to place children of
developing nations abroad).
14.
See Watkins, supra note 10, at 390-91 (discussing a "dwindling supply of
infants available for domestic adoption"); Graff, The Lie We Love, supra note 5 (noting
news story of evangelical couple adopting Korean War orphans swept nation).
15.
See Watkins, supra note 10, at 390 (mentioning societal changes in the 1960s);
Graff, The Lie We Love, supra note 5 ("Thanks to contraception, abortion, and delayed
marriages, the number of unplanned births in most developed countries has declined in
recent decades.").

16.
See Watkins, supra note 10, at 390; Graff, The Lie We Love, supra note 5
("Some women who delay having children discover they've outwaited their fertility ...
17.

Singer, supra note 13, at 283; see Stay Ziv, China's One-Child Policy and

American Adoptees, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 3, 2015, 2:22 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/

what-if-chinese-adoptees-and-end-one-child-policy-390130
[https://perma.cc/X2SG4NX5] (archived Feb. 9, 2018) (stating that "[m]ore than 85,000 children have been
adopted from China and raised in the U.S. since China formally opened its doors to
international adoption in 1992").
18.
See CONN, supra note 9, at 113 ("The AIDS crisis has produced an estimated
15 million orphans around the world."); see also BLAIR ET AL., supra note 5, at 803
(discussing the increase in international adoption).
19.
See BLAIR ET AL., supra note 5, at 803 ("At its peak, over 45,000 children were
placed worldwide in 2004 through intercountry adoption."); Bartholet, Human Rights,
supra note 8, at 95 ("At its peak in 2004, international adoption placed some 45,000
children.").
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In more recent years, however, the number of intercountry
20
In a little over a decade, the number of
adoptions has declined.
intercountry adoptions in the United States-the country that receives
the most internationally adopted children--dropped from 22,989 in
2004 to only 5,370 in 2016.21 Professor Marianne Blair suggests that
this decrease might be explained by "tighter restrictions in both
sending and receiving countries, as well as the development of
domestic adoption systems and a growing antipathy towards
22
international placement in many traditional sending nations."
However, many explanations offered for this dramatic decline
reference the widely publicized corruption in the adoption processes of
23
developing countries.
B. InternationalAgreements Addressing Intercountry Adoption
In the earlier years of intercountry adoption, international
placements were only regulated to the extent that the countries
24
involved created their own laws and processes relating to adoption.
As a result, the legal framework varied greatly depending on which
25
countries were involved in the adoption. By the 1970s, as the practice
grew more common and allegations of corruption became more
26
frequent, the pressure for international governance grew.

See BLAIR ET AL., supra note 5, at 803 (saying the trend of increased
20.
international adoption has been reversing); Stark, supra note 9, at 162 (noting a decline
in intercountry adoptions despite the fact that "[t]here are more babies and children in
orphanages, so-called orphanages, on the street, on the market, or on their own than
ever before").
21.

Intercountry Adoption, Adoption Statistics, BUREAU OF CONsULAR AFFAIRS,

.

DEP'T OF STATE, https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/enlaboutU.S.
us/statistics.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2019) [https://perma.cc/FV7W-59V6] (archived
Oct. 23, 2017) [hereinafter Statistics].
BLAIR ET AL., supra note 5, at 803; see also G. Parra-Aranguren, Explanatory
22.
Report on the Convention on Protection of Children and Co-Operation in Respect of
Intercountry Adoption, Dec. 31, 1993, offprt. From Proceedings of the Seventeenth
Session (1993), Tome II, https://assets.hch.net/upload/expl33e.pdf [https://perma.cc/
CTS8-2FZ9] (archived Oct. 30, 2017) (noting that, even at the time the Hague
Convention was being developed, states of origin were weary of giving the impression
that they were unable to care for their children).
See, e.g., David M. Smolin, Child Laundering:How the IntercountryAdoption
23.
System Legitimizes and Incentivizes the Practicesof Buying, Trafficking, Kidnaping,and
Stealing Children, 52 WAYNE L. REV. 113, 200 (2006) [hereinafter Smolin, Child
Laundering] (discussing the failings of the international adoption system that encourage
child laundering); Stark, supra note 9, at 201-02 ("Some would-be parents may have
been deterred by the moratoria... which made it harder to find a child. Others may have
been deterred by widespread publicity about the same problems that triggered the
moratoria; i.e., corruption, child abduction, and babies and families falling through the
cracks.").
See Watkins, supra note 10, at 391-92 ("There was no international oversight
24.
or regulation . .
See id.
25.
See id. at 392-93 ("By the early 1970s, concerns were being expressed about
26.
the lack of adequate safeguards for children who became the subjects of ICA.").
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The international community responded to this pressure with
three major conventions:2 7 the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child (UN CRC);2 8 the Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child
Prostitution and Child Pornography (Optional Protocol); 29 and the
Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and Cooperation in
Respect of Intercountry Adoption (Hague Convention).3 0
Every intercountry adoption involves two distinct state actors: (1)
a "state of origin" (or "sending state"), the country from which children
are adopted; and (2) a "receiving state," the country where adoptive
parents accept children for permanent placement in their homes.3 1
While, recently, many sending and receiving nations have made efforts
to better regulate intercountry adoption domestically, 3 2 many of these
laws and regulations are guided by the frameworks and principles laid
out in the international conventions. 3 3 The first two conventions-the
UN CRC and the Optional Protocol-primarily address adoption in
passing, as they speak to broader, more general themes. 34 Of these
three instruments, the Hague Convention is the only one which deals
directly and exclusively with intercountry adoption.3 5 For this reason,
some scholars see the Hague Convention as the most promising tool in

27.
See BLAIR ET AL., supra note 5, at 834-35 (saying the "three conventions form
the centerpiece for current international regulation of intercountry adoption").
28.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter UN CRC].
29.
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of
Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, May 25, 2000, 2171 U.N.T.S. 227
[hereinafter Optional Protocol].
30.
Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect
of Intercountry Adoption, May 29, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1134 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
31.
See id. art. 2.
32.
See Marianne Blair, Safeguarding the Interests of Children in Intercountry
Adoption: Assessing the Gatekeepers, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 349, 350-51 (2005) [hereinafter
Blair, Safeguarding] ("Both sending and receiving nations, including the United States,
have also devoted considerable attention during the last decade to domestic legislative
and regulatory reform of their transnational adoption practices.").

33.
See BLAIR ET AL., supra note 5, at 834-35 (saying the three major conventions
are the "centerpiece" for adoption regulation); see also Stark, supra note 5, at 177
(suggesting that adoption law is governed by national laws coordinated by international
instruments and that national adoption laws are also subject to international human
rights law).
34.
See UN CRC, supra note 28, art. 21 (addressing intercountry adoption
directly in only one of the fifty-four articles to the convention); Optional Protocol, supra
note 29, art. 3 (mentioning adoption only in a single subpart of a provision).
35.
See BLAIR ET AL., supra note 5, at 806 ("The most widely-ratified global
convention devoted exclusively to international adoption is the Hague Intercountry
Adoption Convention. .. ."). Some have conceived of the Hague Convention as a response
to the CRC article 21 which calls for additional international agreements to further
promote the best interests of children in intercountry adoption. UN CRC, supra note 28,
art. 21(e); see BLAIR ETAL., supra note 5, at 836 ("The international community answered
the CRC's invitation to establish a global convention devoted specifically to regulating
international adoption by creating the Hague Intercountry Adoption Convention .... ).
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existence for overcoming the bribery and corruption that have
36
traditionally plagued intercountry-adoption processes.
1. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
The UN CRC was adopted on November 20, 1989 and entered into
force on September 2, 1990.37 The convention covers a variety of topics
that are all grounded in the same standard: "the best interests of the
child."38 The UN CRC addresses adoption briefly and in general
terms.39 Although the convention acknowledges intercountry adoption
as a possible means of care for a child, Article 21(b) of the UN CRC
40
limits the incidence of international placements. It only allows the
consideration of international placement in cases where "the child
cannot be placed in a foster or an adoptive family or cannot in any
41
suitable manner be cared for in the child's country of origin." The UN
CRC does, however, raise an important element of safe and appropriate
intercountry adoptions: the requirement that "the placement does not
42
result in improper financial gain for those involved in it." Indeed, the
43
latter two controlling conventions expound upon this principle.
Rather than establishing any concrete legal framework, the UN
CRC suggests ideals regarding what intercountry adoption (as well as
44
domestic adoption) should look like. Parties to the UN CRC are
directed to "ensure that the adoption of a child is authorized only by
competent authorities" and "ensure that the child concerned by intercountry adoption enjoys safeguards and standards equivalent to those
45
existing in the case of national adoption." Some attribute the creation
of a more concrete legal framework in the Hague Convention to the UN

See Stark, supra note 9, at 178.
36.
UN CRC, supra note 28.
37.
See id. art. 21.
38.
Id. ("Parties that recognize and/or permit the system of adoption shall ensure
39.
that the best interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration."); see BLAIR ET
AL., supra note 5, at 835 ('The Convention of the Rights of the Child, the first global
convention to address intercountry adoption, sets a general tone but contains relatively
few directives.").
UN CRC, supra note 28, art. 21(b).
40.
Id.
41.
Id. art. 21(d).
42.
See Optional Protocol, supra note 29, arts. 2-3 (prohibiting and requiring
43.
criminal penalties for the "sale of children"); Hague Convention, supra note 30, art. 32
(defining which costs are permissible and which are not).
See UN CRC, supra note 28, arts. 21(a), (c). Former Cambridge Professor
44.
Andrew Bainham describes the UN CRC as "valuable as general statements of what is
required from states and to what children may be thought to be entitled by the
international community, these principles are stated at a broad level of generality and
do not provide sufficient detail on what action the state is required to take. . . ." Andrew
Bainham, InternationalAdoption from Romania-Why the Moratorium Should Not Be
Ended, 15 CHILD & FAM. L.Q. 223, 231 (2003).
UN CRC, supra note 28, arts. 21(a), (c).
45.
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direction for

countries

2. The UN Optional Protocol on the Convention for the Rights of the
Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child
Pornography
The Optional Protocol to the UN CRC, which was signed in 2000
and entered into force in 2002, only addresses adoption by
criminalizing certain acts.47 Specifically, it requires ratifying states to
penalize individuals and entities who "improperly induc[e]
consent ... for the adoption of a child in violation of applicable
international legal instruments on adoption." 48 The Optional Protocol
does not, however, suggest any specific changes to the current adoption
system or how that system operates.
Professor Marianne Blair suggests that the implementation of
this Optional Protocol in the adoption context may be hindered in the
United States, the largest adopting nation, because of two
interpretations set out in the United States' reservation 49 to the
Optional Protocol.5 0 First, she points out that, according to the
reservation, the United States interprets the term "sale of children" as
only pertaining to transactions that involve payment or consideration
where an individual who lacks "a lawful right to custody of the child
thereby obtains de facto control over the child."5 1 Second, she
highlights that "improperly inducing consent" is defined in a way that
covers only the "knowing and willful inducement of consent by offering
or providing 'compensation for the relinquishment of parental

46.
See e.g., BLAIR ET AL., supra note 5, at 836 ("The international community
answered the CRC's invitation to establish a global convention devoted specifically to
regulating international adoption by creating the Hague Intercountry Adoption
Convention .... ); Dillon, supra note 8, at 203 ("In one sense, the Hague Convention is
itself the child of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child .... ).
47.
See Optional Protocol, supra note 29, art. 3 (listing criminalized activity
involving children); see also BLAIR ET AL supra note 5, at 835 (saying the Optional
Protocol largely only covers the crime of trafficking).
48.
Optional Protocol, supra note 29, art. 3.
49.
The United Nations describes a "reservation" to a convention as "a declaration
made by a state by which it purports to exclude or alter the legal effect of certain
provisions of the treaty in their application in that state." Reservation, U.N. EDUC., SCl.
& CULTURAL ORG., http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/

international- migration/glossary/reservation/
(last
visited
Feb.
15,
2019)
[https://perma.cc/57ZT-BNW4] (archived Feb. 26, 2018).
50.
BLAIR ET AL., supra note 5, at 835-36; see United States Reservation, Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child
Prostitution and Child Pornography, art. 3, May 25, 2000, 2171 U.N.T.S. 227,
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsgno=IV- 1 1-c&chapter=
4&clang= en (last visited Jan. 18, 2018) [hereinafter United States Reservation].
51.
United States Reservation, supra note 50, art. 3; BLAIR ET AL., supra note 5,
at 835-36.
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rights."' 5 2 Thus, she and others have observed that this language
appears to only criminalize inducements for parental consent but does
not reach the trafficking of children from any person or institution
other than a parent.5 3 If these suspicions are right, the Optional
Protocol will have limited effect in intercountry adoptions where the
United States is a party and children are wrongfully trafficked from
54
hospitals, institutions, the street, or relatives other than parents.
3. The Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation
in Respect of Intercountry Adoption
In a memorandum prepared in November 1989, the Hague's
Permanent Bureau acknowledged the insufficiency of the then-existing
55
legal instruments that governed intercountry adoptions. The Bureau
noted four specific requirements it felt needed to be addressed at the
international level: (1) the establishment of legally binding standards
for international adoption; (2) a system of supervision to ensure that
these standards are being met; (3) the establishment of channels of
communication between the authorities of sending and receiving
56
states; and (4) cooperation between sending and receiving nations.
The Hague Convention, championed by the Hague's Permanent
57
Bureau, was the legal instrument ultimately born of these desires.
Indeed, the three primary objectives set forth in Article 1(a)-(c) of
the Hague Convention are consistent with the initially sought
requirements. The Hague Convention seeks to: (a) establish safeguards
to ensure that the best interests and fundamental rights of the child
are accounted for in intercountry adoptions; (b) establish a system of
cooperation amongst contracting states to further ensure the first
objective; and (c) recognize the legitimacy of adoptions made pursuant
58
to the convention among contracting parties. It sets forth the specific
legal standards and procedures to be observed in all intercountry
adoptions between parties to the Hague Convention." Unlike the UN

52.
United States Reservation, supra note 50, art. 3; BLAIR ET AL., supra note 5,
at 835-36.
BLAIR ET AL., supra note 5, at 835-36; see Smolin, Child Laundering, supra
53.
note 23, at 200 ("The federal regulation may in fact be creating a safe harbor for child
trafficking and negligence.").
See Smolin, Child Laundering, supra note 23, at 200 (stating that US
54.
agencies must be held legally accountable for who they partner with to secure adoptions).
See Parra-Aranguren, supra note 22, T 7 (discussing international legal
55.
instrument needs).

&

See id.
56.
See id. ¶ 1-29 (mentioning the Hague's Permanent Bureau's ongoing help in
57.
establishing the Hague Convention).
Hague Convention, supra note 30, art. 1.
58.
See Dillon, supra note 8, at 202-03 (saying the Hague Convention is "an
59.
agreement on the standards to be observed where intercountry adoption occurs . . . .");
Ingi lusmen, The EU and InternationalAdoption from Romania, 27 INT'L J.L. POL.
FAM. 1, 4 (2013) (discussing the Hague Convention's legal status). The former Secretary
General of the Hague Conference on Private International Law described the convention
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CRC, the Hague Convention is narrow in scope and has a practical

focus. 60

Representatives from over fifty countries drafted the Hague
Convention, and both states of origin and receiving states had the
opportunity to advocate for their interests during the drafting
process.6 1 Since the convention entered into force, more than ninety
states-including the United States-have ratified it.6 2 The preamble
to the Hague Convention reveals that the countries involved created
the framework based on their shared belief that "the child, for the full
and harmonious development of his or her personality, should grow up
in a family environment."6 3 Many scholars have observed that the
language of the preamble-particularly the phrase "recognising that
intercountry adoption may offer the advantage of a permanent family
to a child for whom a suitable family cannot be found in his or her State
of origin"-seems to rank intercountry adoption as preferable to other
forms of domestic care such as foster care or institutionalization. 64 The
Hague Conference's Guide to Good Practice No. 1 on the
Implementation and Operation of the Convention (Guide No. 1) seems
as aiming to create "the right conditions under which adoption may take place across
borders in the context of ongoing globalisation." 1993 HAGUE CONVENTION ON
PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AND CO-OPERATION IN RESPECT OF INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION:
25 YEARS OF PROTECTING CHILDREN IN INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION, THE HAGUE
CONVENTION ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW PERMANENT BUREAU 8 (2018),

https://assets.hcch.net/docs/ccbf557d-d5d2-436d-88d6-90cddbe78262.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z9V3-R8F3] (archived Feb. 15, 2019) [hereinafter 25 YEARS].
60.
See Dillon, supra note 8, at 202-03 ("It is important to note that the Hague
Convention is not a human rights convention per se; it is an agreement on the standards
to be observed where intercountry adoption occurs . . . ."); lusmen, supra note 59, at 4
("While the CRC is a broader convention on the general principles constitutive of the
human rights of children, the Hague Convention has a narrower focus, namely it
specifies the procedures and standards that should guide legal [intercountry
adoption]....").
61.
See BLAIR ET AL., supra note 5, at 806; Parra-Aranguren, supra note 22,
T 9-29 (discussing the various drafting meetings and which countries participated).
62.
BLAIR ET AL., supra note 5, at 806 (saying the convention "currently boasts a
membership of over ninety contracting nations, including the United States").
63.
Hague Convention, supra note 30.
64.
Id.; see BLAIR ET AL., supra note 5, at 806 (saying the preamble says that
intercountry adoption provides an opportunity for a child who cannot find a suitable
family in his or her state to find a permanent family); Bartholet, Human Rights, supra
note 8, at 94 (suggesting that international adoption serves the child's bests interests
because of the child's central right to a family). But see Richard Carlson, Seeking the
Better Interests of Children with a New InternationalLaw of Adoption, 55 N.Y. L. SCH.
L. REV. 733, 737 (2010-2011) (stating there is a preference for domestic adoption and
intercountry adoption is a last resort); Dillon, supra note 8, at 213-15 ("[T]he Hague
Convention makes concrete the right of any child to an ethical adoption, where the
national law in the country of origin allows intercountry adoption."); David M. Smolin,
Child Laundering and the Hague Convention on IntercountryAdoption: The Future and
Past of Intercountry Adoption, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 441, 448 (2010) [hereinafter
Smolin, Hague Convention] (emphasizing that "the Convention does not in any way

mandate that ratifying nations place children in intercountry adoption when no family
environment is available for the child within the country of origin" nor does it "create a
right of an institutionalized child to intercountry adoption in absence of a domestic
adoptive placement.").
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to affirm this interpretation, explaining, "if there is a lack of suitable
national adoptive families or carers, it is, as a general rule, not
preferable to keep children waiting in institutions when the possibility
65
exists of a suitable permanent family placement abroad." If this is
the case, this prioritization of intercountry adoption represents an
important departure from Article 21(b) of the UN CRC, which only
permits consideration of international placement when other forms of
care, including foster care and possibly institutionalization, are
unavailable in the child's country of origin, and a shift in the
66
international attitude regarding intercountry adoption.
Article 2 of the Hague Convention limits its scope to circumstances
where a child that is habitually resident in a state of origin "has been,
is being, or is to be moved" to a receiving state for the purpose of
creating a permanent parent-child relationship, where both the state
67
of origin and receiving state are parties to the Hague Convention.
The convention divides the tasks associated with intercountry adoption
68
between states of origin and receiving states. To generalize, receiving
states are responsible for ensuring potential adoptive families are
qualified to adopt, and states of origin are responsible for ensuring that
the child is adoptable and that the consent of the biological parents was
69
The countries that typically have access to the
properly received.
greatest resources-largely the Western receiving states-are required
to do less than the sending countries, which tend to have much higher
instances of poverty and less governmental infrastructure to carry out
70
the assigned tasks.

65.

The Implementation and Operationof the 1993 Hague Intercountry Adoption

Convention Guide to Good Practice,Guide No.1, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, 30

(2008) [hereinafter Guide No. 1] (explaining that "a temporary home in the country of
origin in most cases is not preferable to a permanent home elsewhere," and
"[i]nstitutionalisation as an option for permanent care, while appropriate in special
circumstances, is not as a general rule in the best interests of the child"). It is worth
noting, however, that Guide No. 1 purports to make this shift by simply applying the
"best interests" of the child analysis laid out in the UN CRC. See id.
UN CRC, supranote 28, art. 21(b). Interestingly, the Hague Conference itself
66.
claims that "[t]he 1993 Hague Convention gives effect to Article 21 of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child by adding substantive safeguards and procedures
to the broad principles and norms laid down in the Convention on the Rights of the
Child." INFORMATION BROCHURE, supra note 1, at 5; see also 25 YEARS, supra note 59, at

10 (discussing the safeguards and procedures).
Hague Convention, supra note 30, art. 2. In so framing the reach of the
67.
convention, its drafters declined to extend it to cover the adoption of refugee children
who do not qualify as "habitually resident" in the sending state. See Richard R. Carlson,
The Emerging Law of Intercountry Adoptions: An Analysis of the Hague Conference on
Intercountry Adoption, 30 TULSA L.J. 243, 249 (1994) [hereinafter Carlson, Emerging
Law]. This exclusion makes sense in light of Professor Barbara Stark's observation that
"[m]ost children in crisis are only temporarily separated from parents, or other family
members, who will care for them once they are reunited." Stark, supra note 9, at 175.
See Carlson, Emerging Law, supra note 67, at App. A (discussing which
68.
parties are responsible for each task).
Hague Convention, supra note 30, arts. 4-5.
69.
See Stark, supra note 9, at 178 ("implementing the Convention requires
70.
infrastructure, including mechanisms to ensure accurate record-keeping, that many
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Another important provision of the Hague Convention is Article
6's mandate that each contracting state designate a "central authority"
to discharge the duties imposed by the convention.7 1 This central
authority is a centralized governmental body tasked with overseeing
all of the intercountry-adoption processes in that state and ensuring
ethical compliance. 7 2 However, Articles 9 and 22 allow the functions of
a central authority to be "performed by public authorities or by bodies
accredited under Chapter III," which includes private agencies.73 Some
responsibilities of central authorities may even be carried out by bodies
or persons who are unaccredited, so long as they meet certain
minimum standards and are supervised by "the competent authorities
of that State." 74 These competent authorities can be central
authorities, other public authorities including executive or judicial
entities, or even nonpublic accredited bodies.7 5 Thus, the Hague
Convention rejects the proposal that intercountry adoptions be
facilitated only by public authorities.7 6

III.

THE CURRENT STATE OF INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION AND THE NEED
FOR REFORM

While the Hague Convention establishes safeguards and a
structure of cooperation for the practice of intercountry adoption, not
every country is in compliance with its standards. For one thing,
several countries-including several that act as states of origin-have
not ratified the Hague Convention and, thus, are not bound by the
standards it announced. Even in countries that have ratified the
convention, corruption still exists.7 7

sending states lack"); see also Guide No. 1, supra note 65, at Annex 2-8 ("The Convention
places heavy burdens of responsibility on States of origin . . . .").
71.
Hague Convention, supra note 30, art. 6(1); see also Susann M. Bisignaro,
Intercountry Adoption Today and the Implications of the 1993 Hague Convention
Tomorrow, 13 DICK. J. INT'L L. 123, 142 (1994) ("The most beneficial, yet controversial,
provision of the Convention mandates the establishment of a 'Central Authority' in each
Contracting State . . . . By funneling all intercountry adoptions through one Central
Authority per state, it is hoped that legitimate adoptions will be facilitated and illegal
activity suppressed.").
72.
See Hague Convention, supra note 30, art. 6 ("Contracting State shall
designate a Central Authority to discharge the duties which are imposed by the
Convention upon such authorities.").

73.
74.

Id. arts. 9, 22.
Id. art. 22.

75.

INFORMATION BROCHURE, supra note 1, at 6.

76.
See Carlson, Emerging Law, supra note 67, at 251 (establishing that the
convention allows for the involvement of private agencies).
77.
See Stark, supra note 9, at 199 ("In addition, there have been allegations of
corruption in China, Russia, and South Korea. Some of these cases involved agencies
lying to parents, telling them, for example, that their children would be educated in
America and would send for their parents when they were older.") (footnotes omitted);
Graff, The Lie We Love, supra note 5 (discussing corruption in international adoption).
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While different states face different challenges in regulating
intercountry adoption, the following pattern has repeated itself time
and time again. Many international adoption programs start out as
7
genuine humanitarian efforts involving a handful of adopters. As
word of successful adoptions from a specific nation spreads--often
accompanied by press depicting the terrible situations of children in
that nation waiting to be adopted-interest among Western adoptive
parents grows.79 While the "supply" of children in need of a home
decreases, the "demand" of Western families increases, "leading to that
obvious two-part capitalist solution: increased prices and increased
production."8 0 With hopeful adoptive parents ready to pay a significant
sum to take home a healthy baby, opportunistic middlemen find ways
to "produce" adoptable babies by defrauding and coercing birthparents,
81
Eventually, the
and buying or even abducting healthy children.
adoption-governing entities of the often under-resourced sending
nations reach a point where they can no longer effectively oversee the
82
behavior of everyone involved in the adoption process. It is not until
the state of origin and receiving states become aware of the corruption
that attempts to stop it begin.8 3 Unfortunately, stopping the corruption
frequently entails stopping intercountry adoptions altogether for at
least a period, eliminating the possibility of a home abroad for children
84
who could actually benefit from one.

See E.J. Graff, They Steal Babies, Don't They?, PAc. STANDARD (Nov. 24,
78.
https://psmag.com/news/they-steal-babies-dont-they-international-adoption2014),
(archived Jan. 18, 2018)
schuster-institute-95027 [https://perma.cc/A5MX-46ST]
[hereinafter Graff, They Steal Babies] ("Many poor nations' international adoption
programs started, as in the Ethiopia that Greene portrayed, with a few genuinely
humanitarian adoptions, saving children from desperate circumstances.").
See id. ("[O]nce word spread among hopeful Western parents that healthy
79.
little ones were coming quickly out of a particular country, far more people would sign
up than a small, poor country could effectively manage.").
Id.
80.
See id. ("In the case of inter-country adoptions, far too often, orphans were
81.
"produced" by unscrupulous middlemen who would persuade desperately poor,
uneducated, often illiterate villagers whose culture had no concept of permanently
severing biological ties to send their children away-saying that wealthy Westerners
would educate their children and send them home at age 18, or would send a monthly
stipend, or some other culturally comprehensible fostering plan.").
See id. (discussing the scenario in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
82.
where "numbers were escalating faster than the government could oversee the adoption
industry.").
See id. ("[I]n some countries, humanitarian adoptions metastasize into a
83.
corrupt mini-industry shot through with fraud, expanding dramatically and becoming a
source of income for unscrupulous locals and government officials-until developed
countries, appalled, stop permitting adoptions from that country..."); see also Dillon,
supra note 8, at 243 (establishing that once it becomes known that there are issues,
countries will often stop international adoptions out of reputation concerns).
See Dillon, supra note 8, at 243 (claiming that receiving nations often will
84.
stop intercountry adoptions); Graff, They Steal Babies, supra note 78 ("[U]ntil developed
countries, appalled, stop permitting adoptions from that country, thereby marooning the
children who do need new families abroad.").
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It is worth noting that not all states of origin have faced largescale corruption.8 5 Professor David Smolin has observed that in three
of the countries that send the most children to the United StatesChina, Russia, and South Korea-intercountry adoptions proceeded
generally free of scandal.8 6 He proposes that in countries where there
are "substantial numbers of children abandoned or relinquished for
reasons other than poverty, there is unlikely to be much incidence of
buying or kidnaping children in order to supply 'orphans' for
adoption."8 7 In China, he explains, the population-control policies and
cultural preference for sons led to an availability of many Chinese girls
for adoption abroad.88 In South Korea, Professor Smolin speculates
that most children are relinquished due to the stigma attached to
single motherhood rather than out of desperate poverty.8 9 In Russia,
various social problems led to a large number of institutionalized
children available for adoption, keeping Russian adoptions generally
free of child trafficking.90
Similarly, not all adoption agencies in sending states behave
unethically.9 1 The challenge for receiving states and prospective
adoptive parents is distinguishing between the agencies that act
honorably and those that do not, especially in non-Hague Conventioncountries where the state of origin is not bound by any international
standards of accreditation for adoption service providers.9 2
Guatemala and Ethiopia are two countries that have experienced
corruption due to poorly or under-regulated transnational adoption
practices.9 3 Both countries most commonly act as states of origin, 94 and
both have experienced freezes on intercountry adoption because of

85.
See BLAIR ET AL., supra note 5, at 829 ("Not all sending nations have been
plagued by large-scale scandals.").
86.
Smolin, Child Laundering, supra note 23, at 127-28.
87.
Id. at 127.
88.
Id.
89.
Id.
90.
BLAIR ET AL., supra note 5, at 829.
91.
See Graff, They Steal Babies, supra note 78 (noting that in only "some
countries humanitarian adoptions metastasize into a corrupt mini-industry shot through

with fraud.") (emphasis added).
92.
See id. (listing Ethiopia as an example not governed by the Hague
Convention).

93.
There are, however, many more countries where intercountry adoption
practices have been plagued by corruption and parents and children have been
manipulated for financial gain. See Stark, supra note 9, at 199 (listing also Cambodia,
Nepal, Vietnam, and India as having "widespread trafficking;" Haiti, Sierra Leone,
Congo, Uganda as having a smaller extent of trafficking; and China, Russia, and South
Korea as countries which have faced "allegations of corruption").
94.
See Statistics, supra note 21 (listing the numbers of adoptions from 1999 to
2017); see also Country Profile for IntercountryAdoption, State of Origin, Guatemala,
HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT'L LAw, July 2014, https://www.hcch.net/en/publications-

and-studies/details4/?pid=6221&dtid=42 (last visited Feb. 25, 2019)
Guatemala] (outlining information related to adoptions from Guatemala).

[hereinafter
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corruption.9 5 Neither Guatemala nor Ethiopia had ratified the Hague
Convention at the time the exploitation was occurring, though
96
Guatemala has since signed and ratified it. Although they had not
signed onto the Hague Convention during their adoption crises, major
receiving countries who had ratified it-including the United Statescontinued to participate in adoptions from these countries.
Additionally, the adoption scandals that occurred in Guatemala and
Ethiopia have been publicized and written about to a greater extent
than those in other countries. This is likely due to the scale of the
corruption and the drastic results it led to in both places.
A. The GuatemalanAdoption Crisis
Guatemala fell victim to such corruption from the 1980s into the
2000s.97 During those years, roughly three thousand Guatemalan
infants, relinquished directly from their birthmothers, were placed
98
through intercountry adoption annually. In Guatemala, as in many
developing countries, there has long been a concern that the children
99
in greatest need are not those who are being adopted. In 1999, a UN
Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Sale
of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography visited
Guatemala to evaluate its adoption practices and found that infants
and children were being trafficked for the purpose of intercountry
0
adoption "on a large scale." 10 The rapporteur confirmed that poor
neighborhoods were scouted for eligible babies and parents were
1 01
frequently coerced into giving up their children for money.
Private attorneys, who worked around legal barriers to place
children in adoptive homes without subjecting themselves to exacting
102
These
government supervision, facilitated much of this operation.

See BLAIR ET AL., supra note 5, at 827 (describing Western countries refusal
95.
to adopt from Guatemala following reports of exploitation); Suspension of Adoptions from
Ethiopia, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (May 2, 2017), https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/
7
2
en/News/Intercountry-Adoption-News/ethiopia-adoption-notice-2may O1 .html
[https://perma.cclH6RF-W5MG] (archived Feb. 28, 2018) [hereinafter Suspension of
Adoptions] (describing Ethiopia's self-imposed suspension of all intercountry adoptions).
Guatemala, supra note 94.
96.
See BLAIR ET AL., supra note 5, at 826-27 (discussing a "pattern of systemic
97.
fraud" in Guatemala); Blair, Safeguarding, supra note 32, at 366-71 (providing
information of corruption in Guatemala); Dillon, supra note 8, at 251-52 (describing the
situation in Guatemala).
See Dillon, supra note 8, at 251 ("Under its system, approximately 3,000
98.
infants relinquished by birthmothers have been adopted abroad yearly, mostly to the
United States.").
See id. at 252 (but also noting that "few doubt that there are many children
99.
in Guatemala who are in urgent need of family care").
100. BLAIR ET AL., supra note 5, at 826-27; Blair, Safeguarding,supra note 32, at
366-68.
101. BLAIR ET AL., supra note 5, at 826-27.
102. See id.; Blair, Safeguarding, supra note 32, at 367-68 ("A network of
nurseries, known as "casas cunas" (crib houses), and foster placement for infants
awaiting private placement for adoption have been created by private attorneys, who in
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attorneys typically earned between $15,000 and $20,000 per successful
adoption of a child. 0 3 At one point, the attorney general of Guatemala
alleged that the "network of baby traffickers" included some of the most
powerful public figures, including the president of the Guatemalan
Supreme Court, who evaded prosecution through manipulation of the
court system and judges.1 0 4 Other studies of the situation reached
similarly dismal conclusions. 0 5
By the late 1990s, the problem grew so out of hand that the United
States, Canada, and the United Kingdom started to require DNA
testing for all adopted Guatemalan children.1 06 Yet, this did not slow
the rates of intercountry adoptions sourced by Guatemala.10 7 In the ten
years between 1998 and 2008, almost thirty thousand Guatemalan
children were adopted in the United States alone through private
facilitators. 0 8 Many private attorneys insisted even then that the
majority of adoptions were the result of extreme poverty and not
kidnapping or trafficking. 0 9 It was not until the mid-2000s that
receiving states started to ban adoptions from Guatemala due to these
concerns. 1 10 The United States was the last of the large, Western
adopters to stop receiving Guatemalan children, instituting a ban in
2008.111 Since 2010, the annual number of Guatemalan children
adopted by American families has not exceeded fifty.11 2 In 2016, there
were only two American-Guatemalan adoptions." 3

Guatemala are able to facilitate extrajudicial private adoptions
governmental supervision.") (footnotes omitted).
103. BLAIR ETAL., supra note 5, at 827.

with minimal

104. LAURA BRIGGS, SOMEBODY'S CHILDREN: THE POLITICS OF TRANSRACIAL AND
TRANSNATIONAL ADOPTION 191 (2012).

&

105. See BLAIR ET AL., supra note 5, at 827 ("A UNICEF study the following year
reached similar conclusions. Multiple reports surfaced of women and girls intentionally
becoming pregnant in order to receive adoption fees."); see also Johanna Oreskovic
Trish Maskew, Red Thread or Slender Reed: DeconstructingProf. Bartholet's Mythology
of InternationalAdoption, 147 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 71, 118 (2009) (alleging that as
the number of Guatemalan adoptions went up, so did allegations of women becoming
pregnant and placing children in adoption for payment),
106. BLAIR ET AL., supra note 5, at 827.
107. See id. (noting that "adoptive placements to the United States from
Guatemala rose from 250 in 1990 to 4,727 in 2007").
108. See id. (noting that "[i]n 2006 alone, Americans adopted one out of every 110
children born in Guatemala, and stolen babies were often discovered among the children
who were placed.").
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Statistics, supra note 21. Placements initiated before the moratorium were
still being resolved by the two governments. See BLAIR ET AL., supra note 5, at 827
(saying the United States was "awaiting implementation of a Hague-compliant adoption
process before resuming new placements").
113. Statistics, supra note 21.
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B. Troubles with Ethiopian IntercountryAdoption
1. When and to What Extent Ethiopian Intercountry Adoption Was
Compromised
The rise and decline of intercountry adoption in Ethiopia followed
the common trend of humanitarianism escalating to disorder and
exploitation.1 14 In 2001, there were 165 adoptions of Ethiopian
11 5
On December 22, 2002, the New York Times
children into US homes.
Magazine ran the headline 'What Will Become of Africa's AIDS
16
Greene
Orphans?" for an article by reporter Melissa Fay Greene.1
described the horrific stories of children who had been orphaned by the
AIDS crisis and who were undesirable for adoption in their own
17
Greene
country because of the stigma associated with the disease.'
held
and
wrote that an estimated "million" children had been orphaned
these
for
out intercountry adoption as a shimmering beacon of hope
8
destitute children.1
Those familiar with intercountry-adoption policy could easily
predict the effect this article would have; the US ambassador to
Ethiopia at the time even wrote to the US secretary of state that
"[blecause of recent articles ... we anticipate explosive growth in the
adoption industry, and no letup in the number of individuals
9
attempting to cash in on the process."" By 2006, the U.S. Embassy in
Ethiopia sent word to the U.S. Department of State that "Ethiopia is
the fastest growing source country for adoptions by American citizens,
and the rapid growth mimics the troubling pattern of programs that
20
were eventually closed because of fraud concerns."1
In the following years, international adoptions from Ethiopia
continued to increase, perhaps aggravated by the fact that there were
12
fewer Chinese children available for adoption ' and Guatemalan
22
adoptions were slowing due to fraud and corruption.1 Intercountry
adoptions from Ethiopia reached their peak in 2010 when 2,511
children were adopted in the United States alone (compared to only

114. See Graff, They Steal Babies, supra note 78 (discussing problems with
adopting from Ethiopia and saying the U.S. has no regulatory authority in Ethiopia
when things go wrong).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See id. (discussing Greene's article and its premise).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Professor Smolin suggests that "the large (and increasing) numbers of
intercountry adoptions [in China] over the last decade have begun to exhaust the number
of babies and toddlers who are legally available for adoption." Smolin, Child Laundering,
supranote 23, at 128.
122. See Graff, They Steal Babies, supra note 78 (noting that Guatemalan
adoptions in the United States were limited due to "systematic fraud and corruption."),
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165 a decade before).1 23 The rise in international adoptions from
Ethiopia led to a parallel increase in the number of private adoption
agencies licensed in Ethiopia.1 24 In 2003, Ethiopia had licensed only
three agencies to facilitate intercountry adoptions.1 25 This number
grew to twenty-four in early 2007, and by 2008 there were seventy
licensed agencies facilitating adoptions from Ethiopia.1 26
Inspections by both US and Ethiopian officials, as well as reports
from adoptive families, nonprofits, and some adoption agency officials,
revealed that the increased demand for Ethiopian children had
resulted in exactly the types of fraud and exploitation predicted.1 2 7
Professor Marianne Blair summarizes the many allegations as
including:
[S]olicitations and bribes to parents and families to place their children; falsified
documents; middlemen actively buying and selling children; stash houses used
to house children for only a few hours or days until they could be shipped to
urban areas where no one would know their families; shakedowns from
orphanage directors to agencies demanding cash or project funding for
placements; payments to police to bring infants and young children to private
agencies instead of government-run orphanages; and diversion of young children

from domestic to international placement.

128

One indicator of fraud was that nearly half of the adoptions were
being sourced by a single Ethiopian province: Southern Nations,
Nationalities, and People's Region (SNNPR). The abundance of
children adopted out of this region suggested that some, if not many,
were being "produced" through coercion and collusion with orphanages
and even law enforcement.1 29 A researcher for the U.S. Embassy in
Ethiopia learned of allegations that orphanages in the SNNPR were
bribing parents to give up their children without saying where the
children would be going.' 3 0

123. See id. ("The number of children adopted each year had spiked dangerously,
from 165 in 2001 to 2,511 in 2010, an exponential increase.").
124. See BLAIR ET AL., supra note 5, at 827 (saying there were over seventy licensed
agencies).
125. Graff, They Steal Babies, supra note 78.
126. Id. The Hague's Guide to Good Practice No. 2 relating to the accreditation of
non-governmental entities under the Hague Convention indicates that the accreditation
of children should be tied to "the real needs of children." Accreditation and Adoption
Accredited Bodies: General Principles and Guide to Good Practice, Guide No. 2, HAGUE
CONF. ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, 27, para. 83 (2012). The Guide further suggests that some
Hague states of origin choose to limit the number of accredited bodies operating within
their territory not because they do not have many children in need of homes, but because
"the lack the capacity to assess eligibility for adoption." Id. at 42, para. 170. The concerns
that (a) the number of accredited bodies operating in Ethiopia did not reflect the actual
needs of the adoption system or that (b) Ethiopia lacked the capacity to effectively assess
each child's eligibility for adoption make this increase in the number of licensed agencies
particularly troubling.
127. BLAIR ET AL., supra note 5, at 827.
128. Id.
129. Graff, They Steal Babies, supra note 78.
130. Id.
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In another area, Addis Ababa, it became clear that some
institutions held out to be orphanages were really just "stash houses"
where children were not cared for, but rather temporarily stored before
they could be ferried to ignorant adoptive parents who were able to pay
a significant adoption fee.1 3 1 One investigator visited the Selenaat
Orphanage in Addis Ababa and reported:
The orphanage is a 5 room house, but we did not see any evidence one would
expect of accommodating children there: no beds, no toys, no nanny or other
attendant, no clothes, no food stores. When questioned for what the house is
used, [an orphanage employee] told us it is a temporary place for the children;
13 2
that they stay for just for few hours or 1 day until they are transferred.

A representative from an American adoption agency who worked
in Addis Ababa spoke of orphanage directors "shaking down" adoption
133
The
agencies and demanding more money per orphan.
to
children
allow
to
refusing
of
orphanages
spoke
representative also
accepted
widely
the
despite
parents,
be adopted by Ethiopian
international guideline-agreed upon by the UN CRC and the Hague
Convention-that domestic adoption, when available, is to be given

34
This is almost certainly
preference over international adoption.1
higher payments from
get
can
because orphanage directors
ones.
domestic
than
parents
international adoptive
similar evils.' 3 5 One
from
suffered
country
Other parts of the
orphanage even offered small business "grants" to young Ethiopian
women, but further investigation revealed that those "grants" were
36
only going to pregnant women who relinquished their babies.1
Another orphanage, together with an adoption agency, pressured all
the single parents in an entire township to "register" so those profiting
37
from adoption could convince them to hand over their children
These were the types of situations from which Ethiopia children were
"matched" with Western families, almost all of whom believed they

131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See id.; see, e.g., UN CRC, supra note 28, art. 21(b) (stating that inter-country
adoption is considered only there are not options in "the child's country of origin"); Hague
Convention, supra note 30, at 1135 ("The Convention's Preamble recognizes that the
child, for the full and harmonious development of its personality, should grow up in a
family environment and that intercountry adoption may offer the advantage of a
permanent family to a child for whom a suitable family cannot be found in its State of
origin."); see also Bartholet, Human Rights, supra note 8, at 92 ("UNICEF and many
other international children's organizations promote the idea that unparented children
should be kept at almost all costs in their country of origin"). This principle is referred
to as the "subsidiarity" principle. INFORMATION BROCHURE, supra note 1, at 5
("[C]ontracting States recognise that a child should be raised by his or her birth family
or extended family whenever possible. If that is not possible or practicable, other forms
of permanent care in the State of origin should be considered.").
135. See Graff, They Steal Babies, supra note 78.
136. BLAIR ET AL., supra note 5, at 827; Graff, They Steal Babies, supra note 78.
137. BLAIR ET AL., supra note 5, at 827; Graff, They Steal Babies, supra note 78.
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were acting ethically or even altruistically.1 3 8 Many adoptive parents
remained ignorant of their children's beginnings until the children
became able to express themselves in English-sometimes revealing
that their biological parents were not deceased as the adoptive parents
had been told.1 3 9

2. The International Response to Ethiopia's Adoption Problems
In 2008, the adoption staffers at the U.S. Embassy in Ethiopia
began conducting surprise visits to American adoption agencies
operating in Ethiopia and some Ethiopian orphanages with whom the
agencies worked. 140 When the staffers became aware of suspicious
activity, they reported it to the Ethiopian government, which had the
authority to delicense the corrupt agencies.1 4 1 In July 2008, the
Ethiopian foreign minister revealed to a US ambassador that the
Ethiopian government was considering stopping intercountry
adoptions altogether, having "concluded that middlemen were actively
buying and selling children for intercountry adoptions." 4 2 The United
States and the Joint Council on International Children's Services
(JCICS), a nongovernmental organization, urged the government to
delicense crooked adoption agencies without shutting down adoptions
entirely.1 4 3 The Ethiopian government agreed not to suspend all
intercountry adoptions and conducted a review of all adoption service
providers.1 44 However, even after inspection, the government did not
delicense any agencies, even those known to have behaved
unethically.1 45 Ethiopian officials told the U.S. Embassy that they
blamed Ethiopian orphanages rather than American adoption agencies
for the corruption, but felt the Ethiopian federal government had too
little control over regional and local governments to make effective
changes at those levels.1 4 6 Despite the United States' attempts to
regulate its own agencies in Ethiopia, corruption persisted.1 47
Following the peak level of intercountry adoptions in 2010, the
Ethiopian government's Ministry of Women, Children, and Youth
Affairs (MOWCYA), which governed adoptions throughout Ethiopia,
resolved to fight the corruption by dramatically slowing down
adoptions.' 4 8 In other countries, like Guatemala, Vietnam, and
Cambodia, the United States had endorsed halting intercountry

138. See Graff, They Steal Babies, supra note 78 (discussing the fallacy that
millions of healthy children are waiting in orphanages for adoption).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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adoptions as a way to deal with corruption, but with regard to Ethiopia,
it felt that the government did take the problem seriously and wanted
14 9
to partner with Ethiopian officials in cleaning up the system.
In 2011, the US and Ethiopian governments entered into a new
process together.1 5 0 The process, called PAIR (Pre-Adoption
Immigration Review), involved the authorization of the U.S.
to conduct
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
investigations into each child's eligibility for adoption before the child
151
was legally adopted in an Ethiopian court.
This new arrangement did contribute to a decrease in the number
of intercountry adoptions. 152 By 2016, US parents adopted only 182
Ethiopian children.1 5 3 The number of licensed adoption agencies in
Ethiopia also declined, and intercountry-adoption proponents hoped
that this new system would mean that a complete moratorium was no
longer a possibility.1 54
3. Recent Developments in Ethiopia
In 2017, the status of intercountry adoption in Ethiopia took a
surprising turn.1 5 5 On April 21, 2017, the Ethiopian Prime Minister's
Office declared that it was immediately suspending all intercountry
adoptions. 156 On May 26, 2017, the U.S. Department of State issued an
update saying that MOWCYA would resume processing intercountryadoption cases but would "only issue negative letters," meaning it
57
intended to decline all applications for overseas adoptions.1 The
Department of State further explained that this policy would apply to
"all intercountry adoption cases, regardless of their stage in the process
or the nationality of the adoptive parents," and noted that there had
been no formal communication between the Ethiopian government and.
158
The State Department also
US officials concerning the suspension.

4

149. Id.
150. BLAIR ET AL., supra note 5, at 828; Graff, They Steal Babies, supra note 78.
151. BLAIR ET AL., supra note 5, at 828; Graff, They Steal Babies, supra note 78.
152. See Statistics, supra note 21 (showing 2,511 adoptions from Ethiopia to the
United States in 2010, 1,732 in 2011, 1,567 in 2012, 993 in 2013, 716 in 2014, 335 in
2015, and only 182 adoptions in 2016).
153. Id.
154. BLAIR ET AL., supra note 5, at 828; Graff, They Steal Babies, supra note 78.
155. See Suspension ofAdoptions, supra note 95 (stating that the Ethiopian Prime
Minister's Office declared an immediate suspension of intercountry adoptions).
156. Id.
157. Update: Ethiopia Suspension of Adoptions, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (May 26,
2017), https://travel.state.gov/content/travellen/News/Intercountry-Adoption-News/
(archived
[https://perma.cc/BHA4-ESWB]
ethiopia-adoption-notice-26may2017.html
Feb. 28, 2018).
158. Id. (claiming the lack of communication was due to the Prime Minister's
Office holding of "government-wide, minister-level meetings with various Ethiopian
government ministries throughout the month of May").
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used the May 26, 2017 update to recommend that prospective parents
consider other countries for international adoptions. 15 9
In June 2017, MOWCYA issued the necessary documents to begin
the immigration process for some Ethiopian children that had already
been legally adopted by American parents. 6 0 However, the status of
many intercountry adoptions remained unclear. 161 This resulted in
some prospective adoptive parents waiting over a year for the
appropriate regional office to issue the documents required for adopted
children to travel to their new homes.'16 In November, the Ethiopian
government made clear that it would only complete adoptions that had
reached a certain point in the administrative process.1 63 This meant
that the adoptions of parents who had been matched with a child, but
had not reached the requisite point in the paperwork, were called off
completely.1 64
All the while, adoption agencies continued to make new referrals
in Ethiopia and encouraged adoptive parents to accept them. 16 5 In
response to this practice, the U.S. Department of State issued another
adoption notice, expressing its frustration with these adoption agencies
and stating outright that "[t]he Embassy has received no informationindicating that the Ethiopian Ministry of Women and Youth Affairs'
decision will change even if regional processing or court processing
66
continues to occur."s
This practice was especially problematic
because
the adoption agencies
often required significant,
nonrefundable fees and sometimes required adoptive parents to pay
monthly fees to provide for the needs of the Ethiopian child with whom

159. Id.
160. See Update on Suspension of Adoptions from Ethiopia, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE
(June 16, 2017), https://travel.state.gov/content/travellen/News/Intercountry-AdoptionNews/ethiopia-adoption-notice- 16june2017.html
[https://perma.ccLXQ4-6D8N]
(archived Feb. 28, 2018).
161. See id. ("The State Department has not received information from the
Ethiopian government about which additional cases may be allowed to continue. To date,
the Ethiopian government has not released an official statement on the suspension or
the future of intercountry adoption from Ethiopia.").
162. Ethiopia Adoption Notice: Delays in Processing Adoptions, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE (Sept.

29,

2017), https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/News/Intercountry-

Adoption-News/ethiopia-adoption-notice-29sept2017.html
[https://perma.cc/C9M3RHVA] (archived Feb. 28, 2018).
163. Ethiopia Adoption Notice: Latest Information Regarding Adoptions, U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE (Nov. 8, 2017), https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/News/

Intercountry-Adoption-News/ethiopia-adoption-notice-08nov2017.html
[https://perma.cc/BB49-DSP8] (archived Feb. 28, 2018) (explaining that "the ONLY
adoption cases that the government of Ethiopia will allow to proceed to completion under
Ethiopia's current law are cases with a completed Form 1-604 determination OR cases
that have a Form 1-604 determination that is currently pending with the U.S. Embassy
in Addis Ababa").
164. Id.
165. EthiopiaAdoption Notice: Additional Information ConcerningNew Referrals,
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (Dec. 12, 2017), https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/

en/News/Intercountry-Adoption-News/ethiopia-adoption-notice --additional-informationconcerning-new-.html [https://perma.cc/D3WX-5CCD] (archived Feb. 28, 2018).
166. Id.
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they had been matched. 16 7 If these "adoptions" were carried out to the
point of finalization in a regional court, the adoptive parents may
assume legal and financial responsibility for a child they would never
be permitted to bring home due to MOWYCA's withholding of
168
necessary documents.
On January 9, 2018, the Ethiopian Parliament passed new
169
The state-run
legislation banning all intercountry adoptions.
Ethiopian News Agency (ENA) cited concerns over abuse by foreign
17 0
Specifically, the ENA said that
families as the reason for the ban.
intercountry adoption had made Ethiopian children "vulnerable to
identity crisis, psychological problems and violation of rights."171 That
is, Ethiopian legislators cited concerns that their native children were
being mistreated in their new homes overseas, and made no formal
72
reference to corrupt adoption practices as the reason for the law.'
Many news sources have connected the ban to the conviction of a US
couple for the death of their thirteen-year-old daughter who had been
adopted from Ethiopia.1 73 The girl, Hana Williams, died in 2011 of
hypothermia and malnutrition after she had been forced to remain
74
Despite concerns about the
outside on a cold rainy night.
mistreatment of Ethiopian adoptees, some Ethiopian lawmakers still
worried that the domestic childcare resources in Ethiopia would be
75
unable to effectively handle the aftermath of the ban.'

/

167. Id.
168. Id.
169. EthiopiaAdoption Notice: EthiopiaPasses Legislation Banning Intercountry
Adoption, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (Jan. 11, 2018), https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/
en/News/Intercountry-Adoption-News/ethiopia-adoption-notice--ethiopia-passeslegislation-banning-in.html [https://perma.cclPA9V-YXY8] (archived Feb. 28, 2018).
170. Bijan Hosseini, Ethiopia bans foreign adoption, CNN (Feb. 3, 2018),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/11/africalethiopia-foreign-adoption-ban/index.html
(quoting ENA concerns that children adopted by foreign families had been exposed to
"various crimes and social crisis in the country they grew up in").
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See, e.g., Ethiopia Bans Foreign Adoptions, BBC NEWS (Jan. 10, 2018),
[https://perma.cc/GD7H-GFQJ]
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42635641
(archived Feb. 25, 2019) (saying the death and homicide case led to a discussion about
international adoption); Hosseini, supra note 170; Elias Meseret, Ethiopia'sLawmakers
2018),
10,
(Jan.
NEWS
AP
Foreign Adoptions,
on
Ban
Approve
https://www.apnews.com/b83a81d497dO44b117406bcb4bl0216 [https://perma.cc/6FBF2HJG] (archived Feb. 25, 2019) ("But the death in the U.S. in 2011 of an Ethiopia-born
girl, with her adoptive mother convicted of homicide by abuse, led to an outcry back
home, with Ethiopia that year reducing foreign adoptions by 90 percent.").
USA
174. Doug Stanglin, Prosecutionsays adopted girl died in 'house of horrors,'
6
9
TODAY (Sept. 6, 2013), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/0 /0
ethiopian-adopted-hana-williams-mount-vernon-washington-state-house-of-horrorstrial/2776027/ [https://perma.cc/AEU9-8J7P] (archived Feb. 24, 2018).
175. Meseret, supra note 173.
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IV. WHY THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK FALLS SHORT OF
PREVENTING THESE CRISES

A. The Imbalance of Resources and Obligations between Sending and
Receiving States
As of 2018, ninety-nine countries have become members to the
Hague Convention.' 7 6 Of the seventy-six countries that have filed
Hague profiles, twenty-five operate as receiving states, thirty-eight
operate as states of origin, and thirteen operate as both. 177 Nearly
every nation operating as a receiving state is located in western
Europe, with the additions of the United States, Canada, Australia,
and New Zealand.17 8 The only exceptions are a few eastern European
countries, a handful of countries that operate as both sending and
79
receiving states, and Venezuela.o
The states of origin are largely
eastern European nations, South and Central American nations,
African nations, and South and Southeast Asian nations. 8 0
Intercountry-adoption scholars have framed the relationship between
most sending and receiving states as "a linkage between developing
nations and rich nations."181
While there are exceptions, the vast majority of states of origin
lack the financial resources and governmental infrastructure to carry
out the tasks assigned to them by the Hague Convention.1 82 The Hague
Conference itself admitted, as recently as 2018, that many states lack
"the necessary resources to implement an efficient child protection
system." 8 3 Some states avoid the Hague Convention altogether, never
acceding to it. Lack of finances and infrastructure that are required for
successful implementation are two reasons some countries avoid

176. Status Table, 33: Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protectionof Children and
Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW,
https://www.hech.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=69 (last visited Mar.
1, 2019) [https://perma.cc/G7H6-P983] (archived Feb. 25, 2019) [hereinafter Status
Table].
177. Country Profiles-State Responses, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW,
https://www.hcch.net/en/publications-and-studies/details4/?pid=6221&dtid=42
(last
visited Mar. 1, 2019) [https://perma.cc/6UH9-TTMT] (archived Feb. 25, 2019) (clicking
on each individual country will reveal that country's profile).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. Note that no nations under Islamic law are members to the convention
because adoption is not recognized by Islamic law.
181. Smolin, Poverty, supra note 8, at 436; see also Bartholet, Propriety, Prospects
and Pragmatics, supra note 1, at 182-83 ("It can be viewed as the ultimate form of
exploitation, the taking by the rich and powerful of the children born to the poor and
powerless.").
182. See Dillon, supra note 8, at 201 n.67 ("It is undoubtedly difficult for countries
with little in the way of governmental and administrative infrastructure to meet the
costs of implementing the Hague Convention.").
183. 25 YEARS, supra note 60, at 15.
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ratification.18 4 For others, the difficulty advancing the goals of the
Hague Convention on their own leads many sending nations to turn to
185
private actors for assistance with the administrative burden.
Articles 9 and 22 of the convention allow the fulfillment of many steps
in the process by actors accredited by the state of origin's central
1 86
This reliance on the
authority or even unaccredited persons.
assistance of private agencies incentivizes sending states to do as
Ethiopia did and refuse to delicense agencies accused of suspicious
7
behavior.18
Despite these resource discrepancies, a simple evaluation of the
text of the Hague Convention suggests that the administrative burden
placed on states of origin is greater than that placed on receiving
states.1 8 8 Receiving states are first tasked with determining that
89
prospective adoptive parents are "eligible" and "suited to adopt."'
Second, they are responsible for ensuring that the adoptive parents
1 90
Third, and finally, the
have received appropriate counseling.
receiving states must determine that the child to be adopted will
91
actually be authorized to permanently reside in their country.
States of origin, on the other hand, must: (1) establish that the
child is suitable for adoption; (2) consider permanent placements
within their state and determine that intercountry adoption is truly in
the best interests of the child; (3) ensure that the biological parents
were appropriately counseled and informed of the effects of their
decision, and that their consent was freely given, given in the correct
legal form, not induced by compensation of any kind, not later
withdrawn, and given only after the birth of the child; and (4) ensure
that the child has been appropriately counseled and informed of the
effects of the adoption, that his or her wishes have been considered,
and that the child's consent (where required) was given freely, in the
19 2
Sending
correct form, and not induced by any kind of compensation.
countries are responsible for overseeing every stage in the process
where corruption has tended to occur: namely, ensuring that children
are "adoptable" and that consents to the adoption were properly
received.

184. Caeli Elizabeth Kimball, Barriers to the Successful Implementation of the
Hague Convention on Protection of Childrenand Co-Operationin Respect of Intercountry
Adoption, 33 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 561, 573 (2005).
185. See Dillon, supra note 8, at 239 (discussing the allowance of "facilitators" to
run the adoption system because implementation is difficult).
186. Hague Convention, supranote 30, arts. 9, 22.
187. See Graff, They Steal Babies, supra note 78 (detailing the large growth in
adoption agencies in Ethiopia from three in 2000 to more than seventy in 2008).
188. Compare Hague Convention, supra note 30, art. 5 (listing three tasks for
receiving states), with id. art. 4 (listing ten tasks for states of origin).
189. Id. art. 5(a).
190. Id. art. 5(b).
191. Id. art. 5(c).
192. Id. art. 4.
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B. The Role of PrivateAdoption Agencies in Intercountry Adoption
The Hague Convention's standards for allowing nongovernmental
actors to carry out various steps in the intercountry-adoption process
are exceedingly vague. Article 10 states that "[ajccreditation shall only
be granted to and maintained by bodies demonstrating their
competence to carry out properly the tasks with which they may be
entrusted."1 9 3 Article 22 provides that unaccredited bodies or persons
may also carry out many of the procedural requirements for adoptions
so long as they "meet the requirements of integrity, professional
competence, experience and accountability of that State," and "are
qualified by their ethical standards and by training or experience to
work in the field of intercountry adoption." 194 Yet nowhere does the
Hague Convention give any guidance as to what minimum standards
of competence, integrity, and experience should be.' 95
Article 11 does direct that accredited bodies "pursue only nonprofit objectives," and Article 32 states that "[n]o one shall derive
improper financial or other gain from an activity related to
intercountry adoption." 196 However, Article 32 also provides that
persons involved in the adoption are entitled to "reasonable
professional fees" and remuneration so long as it is not "unreasonably
high in relation to services rendered."1 97 Again, the Hague Convention
fails to give guidance as to what constitutes a "reasonable fee" and
which fees are "unreasonably high."19 8
To answer some of these questions surrounding accredited bodies,
the Hague's Permanent Bureau published a Guide to Good Practice No.
2 (Guide No. 2) in 2012 concerning "Accreditation and Adoption
Accredited Bodies."' 99 Guide No. 2 explains that nonaccredited bodies
and persons permitted to perform some duties under Article 22 are not
bound by all the same requirements as accredited bodies. 200
Specifically, Guide No. 2 states that nonaccredited persons are not
bound by the "non-profit objectives" requirement of Article 11(a). 20 It
explicitly states that Article 22 nonaccredited bodies "may undertake
adoptions for profit." 202 Professor Dawn Watkins summarized the
reaction of many to this revelation: "The fact that individuals operating
on a 'for profit' basis can be involved in a Hague-compliant
[intercountry adoption] is shocking." 203 Professor Watkins correctly
points out that allowing adoptions to occur on a for-profit basis goes

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. art. 10.
Id. art. 22.
See id. arts. 10, 22.
Id. arts. 11(a), 32.
Id. art. 32.
See id.
Guide No. 2, supra note 126.
Id. at 126, para. 632.
Id.
Id.
Watkins, supra note 10, at 399.

712

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 52:685

directly against the Hague Convention's stated objective in Article 1(b)
204
This
to "prevent the abduction, the sale of, or traffic in children."
interpretation of Article 11(a) opens an enormous back door for private
actors in the intercountry-adoption process to avoid scrutiny even
205
when they are making a profit off of each adoption they procure.
The Hague Convention itself and Guide No. 2 give rise to concerns
that the state in which a body is authorized or accredited-very
frequently the state of origin-holds the majority of power for
determining if it will stay authorized or accredited. Receiving states
have more of a role in making the initial accreditation determination.
Article 12 of the Hague Convention requires that "[a] body accredited
in one Contracting State may act in another Contracting State only if
the competent authorities of both states have authorised it to so do." It
is unclear from the terms of the convention itself whether the same is
206
but Guide No. 2
required for nonaccredited persons or bodies,
207
Additionally, in its
suggests that dual approval is still preferred.
"Model Criteria for Accreditation of Bodies in Receiving States," Guide
No. 2 recommends not allowing accredited bodies to commence their
work in the state of origin until they have been duly authorized by the
2 08
receiving state as well.

However, in trying to proscribe the best practices for accreditation
and monitoring of private bodies involved in adoption, even Guide No.
2 leaves several oversight powers solely in the hands of the state that
209
The Model Criteria provide that
accredited the body to begin with.
accredited bodies should be open to inspection at any time by the
2 10
The
competent authorities of the state in which they are accredited.
Model Criteria also provide that accreditation may be revoked or
suspended by the competent authority of the state of origin if it has, in
some way, violated the principles of the Hague Convention or the laws
or regulations of that state.2 11 Thus, even the Model Criteria leave no
room for the receiving state to conduct investigations into the agencies
that are processing the adoptions of children to their countries, nor the
power to terminate the accreditation so long as the state of origin has
no objection to its continued operation.

204. Id. at 399-400 (citing Hague Convention, supra note 30, art. 1(b)).
205. Prof. David Smolin points out another problem with tying intercountry
adoptions to financial incentives: "[p]ersons who financially benefit from the
intercountry adoption system become invested in the lack of alternative systems" such
as child and human welfare systems. David M. Smolin, The Corrupting Influence of the
United States on a Vulnerable Intercountry Adoption System: A Guide for Stakeholders,
Hague and Non-Hague Nations, NGOs, and Concerned Parties,2013 UTAH L. REV. 1065,
1076 (2013).
206. Watkins, supra note 10, at 404.
207. Guide No. 2, supra note 126, at 130, para. 655.
208. Id. at annex 1, para. 3.4(a).
209. Id. at annex 1, para. 4.2.
210. Id.
211. Id. at annex 1, para. 3.6.
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C. Existing Policy Proposals
1. Full Moratoria
One response to corruption in intercountry adoption is to ban this
form of adoption altogether, either temporarily or permanently. While
a seemingly dramatic approach, this has often been the response of
sending or receiving nations when reports of corruption have
surfaced-not only in Guatemala and Ethiopia, but in other nations as
well. 2 12 The 2001 moratorium on international adoptions from
Romania led some to write in favor of maintaining the ban
indefinitely. 2 13 One early argument in favor of the ban was that the
child welfare system in Romania could only be reformed if intercountry
adoptions were halted. 214 In other words, some thought that the
availability of intercountry adoption lowered the urgency of repairing
a broken child welfare system, leaving the many children who would
not be adopted in devastating conditions. 215 Another concern was that
intercountry adoption was too influenced by outside influences like
adoption lobbies and political factors to tell if promoting adoption
abroad was really in the best interests of the children. 216 Professor
Andrew Bainham advocated for an even bolder argument in favor of a
permanent moratorium in Romania. 217 Bainham argued that "children
are abandoned precisely because of the availability of international
adoption." He posited that if intercountry adoption were banned,
parents would no longer have an incentive to surrender their children
to others for money.21 8 Bainham further argued that international
adoption diverts resources away from domestic adoption as well as
more useful preventive measures via social welfare programs. 219

212. See, e.g., Azzam Ameen, Sri Lankan baby trade: Minister admits illegal
adoption trade, BBC (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41339520
[https://perma.cc/DT2M-YBKK] (archived Apr. 10, 2019) ("Sri Lanka temporarily
banned intra-country adoptions in 1987 when one 'baby farm' was raided, and 20
newborns were found inside."); lusmen, supra note 59, at 8-10 (detailing the
circumstances which led to the moratorium on international adoptions from Romania in
2001).
213. See, e.g., Bainham, supra note 44, at 234-35 ("Romania has made substantial
strides towards a child protection system which should ultimately result in the total
closure of large-scale institutions."); lusmen, supra note 59, at 8-10 (discussing
Romania's moratorium on international adoptions).
214. See lusmen, supra note 59, at 8-9 ("[T]he system could not be reformed if
children did not become part of the system because they had been sent abroad.").
215. Id.
216. See id. at 20-21 ("[I]t appears that exogenous factors, such as adoption
lobbies, and endogenous processes, such as the EU's embrace of a child's rights agenda,
provided the EU with the rationale to endorse a pro-ICA role and scope inside the
Union ....

).

217. Bainham, supra note 44, at 234-35.
218. Id. at 235.
219. Id.
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Other scholars have found this view of intercountry adoption
extreme. 2 20 Professor Elizabeth Bartholet, a major proponent of
intercountry adoption, argues that even if there are abuses in the
intercountry- adoption system, "shutting down international adoption
is wrong."2 21 She feels that the harm that would occur for the many
children who could be helped with intercountry adoptions is not worth
these other goals. 2 22 She goes as far as to argue that intercountry
adoption serves not only the interests of the children and the adoptive
parents, but also the birth parents who want the best for their
22 3
children.
2. The "Aid Rule"
Professor David Smolin proposed another solution to corruption in
2 24
He would
intercountry adoption: what he calls the "Aid Rule."
require "family preservation assistance" be offered to birth parents
living on $1 per day before they could legitimately relinquish their
225
The family
children to be eligible for intercountry adoption.
preservation assistance is financial assistance to be given to parents
considering relinquishing their children in order to eliminate the
number of birth parents who want to raise their children but allow
226
Smolin accurately
them to be adopted out of financial desperation.
points out the "particular irony" that many adoptive parents spend
nearly $30,000 on adopting a child from another country when several
hundred dollars would be enough to allow the birth parents to continue
22 7
Even some adoptive parents have expressed
caring for the child.

doubts over whether it would be better to give the money spent on the
228
adoption to the child's birth family.
Smolin argues that many impoverished parents would be inclined
to keep their children, thereby limiting the number of children who are
"sold" in intercountry adoption contrary to the objectives of the Hague
Convention, if they were given even minimal amounts of aid to afford
their basic needs.22 9 He argues that any consent from those in extreme

.

220. See, e.g., Bartholet, Human Rights, supra note 8, at 92-93 (arguing that
despite its faults international adoption is good).
221. Id. at 96.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 99.
224. Smolin, Poverty, supra note 8, at 438 (explaining the "Aid Rule").
225. Id. at 415.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 430-31.
228. See Jane Gross & Will Connors, Surge in Adoptions Raises Concern in
Ethiopia, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2007, at Al, A16 (quoting an adoptive mother and father:
"Should we just give all the money we're spending on this to the children's mother?. .
It was obvious the birth mother loved her children .. . She said to us, 'Thank you for
sharing my burden."').
229. See Smolin, Poverty, supra note 8, at 430-31 (noting that the Preamble to the
Hague Convention prioritizes children remaining with their natural families).
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poverty should be subject to serious scrutiny. 2 30 He believes the "Aid
Rule" would strengthen the system of intercountry adoption by
reducing ethical concerns regarding the vulnerability of poor birth
parents. 231
Smolin proposes that the adoptive parents give the aid. 232 He
suggests that an increase in the cost of an adoption for adoptive
parents already spending tens of thousands on an adoption would be
manageable and perhaps adoptive parents would appreciate the
additional assurance. 233 He even suggests capping the fees of
facilitators, another source of corruption, to offset some of the cost. 2 34
While his idea makes sense in theory, practical considerations
weigh against its overall effectiveness. Smolin himself acknowledges
that many will be skeptical of a suggestion that pumps more money
into a system that is so easily corruptible by unethical financial
incentives. 2 35 While Smolin is probably correct in assuming that many
would be willing to pay, 236 tapping adoptive parents for more money
cannot itself be an adequate solution. There are already substantial
amounts of money in the system-of which the large majority is
provided by adoptive parents and passed through private agencies.
Smolin proposes solving this issue on a country-by-country basis,
where each system is evaluated for the best method of acquiring and
distributing aid.2 37 Still, his proposed solution is not persuasive enough
to ease the concern that more money in the intercountry-adoption
system will likely lead to more people misusing the system for personal
gain. It is also worth noting that the example solutions Smolin gives
rest on the existence and administrative capacity of a family welfare
system in the sending state.23 8 While there can be no doubt that
poverty plays a part in the corruption, many sending countries also
lack the infrastructure to implement all the programs the
international community asks them to implement. Smolin's "Aid Rule"
adds to the already too-large administrative burden on sending states.

230. See id. at 440-41 (comparing the consent of destitute parents to the consent
of "some impoverished persons ... to the use of their bodies (or their children's bodies)
for paid sexual services in order to feed themselves and their children.").
231. See id. at 445 (noting that the Aid Rule's transparency would alleviate some
of the propensity for fraud in the current system).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. See id. at 449 ("Given a history in which intercountry adoption 'donations'
sometimes have been misappropriated, and become a part of the 'price' or motivation to
obtain children illicitly, creating yet another kind of donation seems risky.") (quoting
Smolin, Child Laundering, supra note 23).
236. Id. at 445.
237. See id. at 452 ("The solution to this dilemma necessarily would have to vary
with the particular circumstances of each significant sending nation.").
238. See id. (suggesting that the family welfare systems operate independently
from the intercountry adoption system, certify for every adoption that reasonable family
preservations efforts were made and failed, and be free of financial incentive for making
children available for international adoption).
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3. A Global Effort to Regulate Intercountry Adoption
Other scholars have advocated for a global effort to combat
corruption. There are two significant proposals that require a neutral,
international entity: (1) a global fund to assist countries in
239
and (2) a
implementing the requirements of the Hague Convention,
regularly convening global body to assess needs and prescribe rules
24 0
regarding intercountry adoption.
a. A Global Assistance Fund
The Hague's Permanent Bureau has actually embraced the idea
of a global fund to assist countries in the effective implementation of
the burdens of
Convention. 24 1 Acknowledging
the Hague
implementation on some under-resourced nations, the bureau
developed the Intercountry Adoption Technical Assistance Programme
(ICATAP) to aid the operation of the Hague Convention in these
countries. 24 2 The Permanent Bureau operates ICATAP, sometimes in
243
partnership with other knowledgeable individuals or groups.
According to the Hague's information brochure on the Hague
Convention, assistance may include helping countries create and
review necessary legislation and regulations, giving advice to central
authorities, or offering training to relevant actors in the adoption
process. 24 4 Prior to the creation of ICATAP, Professor Sara Dillon had
suggested the establishment of a fund and proposed that it be funded
24 5
by some percentage of adoption fees paid by the adoptive parents.
The Permanent Bureau, the central authorities of states with good
practices, or an external consultant, sometimes in co-operation with
UNICEF or International Social Services, provides ICATAP's technical
2 46
assistance.

239. See, e.g., Dillon, supra note 8, at 239-40 ("It seems clear that the Hague
Convention requires the establishment of a fund.").
240. See Blair, Safeguarding, supra note 32, at 401-02 (advocating for the
development of a "small but permanent oversight body" to serve the needs of domestic
and international policymakers); Dillon, supra note 8, at 254 ("International human
rights principles, applied in light of the demands of the human psyche, require a global
regime to deal with children without families.").
241. INFORMATION BROCHURE, supra note 1, at 12 (noting that the Hague
Convention Permanent Bureau established the "ICTAP ... to provide assistance directly
to the governments of certain States.").
242. See id.
243. See id. ("[S]ubject to the availability of funding, ICATAP is operated directly
by the Permanent Bureau, as well as in co-operation with international consultants and
experts, and international organisations such as UNICEF.").
244. Id. at 12-13 (also listing "help in developing the tools to achieve the above
activities," "providing judges with relevant training," and "providing information and
advice to States considering ratification or accession" as possible forms of assistance).
245. Dillon, supra note 8, at 239-40.
246. 25 YEARS, supra note 59, at 35.
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The information brochure acknowledges that the operation of
ICATAP is "[s]ubject to the availability of funding." 24 7 While a global
fund may well help developing countries better implement the
provisions of the Hague Convention, reliance on donations of member
states or even fees from adoptive parents leaves this suggestion
vulnerable. In its 2010 report, the Hague Conference's "Special
Commission on the practical operation of the 1993 Hague Convention"
(Special Commission) simultaneously recognized "the great value" of
ICATAP and the "limited resources available to the Permanent Bureau
to maintain ICATAP."24 8 Efforts to maintain ICATAP or create other
assistance funds should be encouraged, but on their own they are not
sufficient. A holistic approach to eliminating corruption in intercountry
adoptions requires more than just the existence of funds for training.
b. A Global Intercountry Adoption Oversight Body
Another proposal for solving problems of corruption in
intercountry adoption is the establishment of a global agency to
oversee and study the operation of the Hague Convention's
principles. 249 Professor Dillon calls the current nationally based
system "piecemeal" and "confusing." 250 In her opinion, the current
structure results in adop tions that are wrongly regulated in some
states (leaving truly adoptable children without homes) and underregulated in others (leading to corruption). 251 She, therefore, believes
that a new global body must be developed to best represent the needs
of children in intercountry adoption. 2 52
Professor Marianne Blair also advocates for the creation of a
global oversight body. 2 53 Blair is less critical of the current regime, but
nevertheless finds that a small, permanent, and international
oversight body would aid both domestic and international
policymakers in reducing corruption. 254 Both Blair and Dillon suggest

247.

INFORMATION BROCHURE, supra note 1, at 12.

248. Id. at 21.
249. See Blair, Safeguarding, supra note 32, at 401-02 ("Both the prevention of
trafficking and the implementation of strategies to encourage domestic placement
without abandoning children to state care would be greatly enhanced by development of
an international oversight body."); Dillon, supra note 8, at 254 ("[A] separate, objective,
and specialized agency . . . should be set up through a widely representative
conference.").
250. Dillon, supra note 8, at 254.
251. Id.
252. See id. (going so far as to say that a global regime is required by international
human rights principles).
253. See Blair, Safeguarding, supra note 32, at 401-03 (concluding that an
international oversight body could more adequately monitor criminally induced consent,
fraud, or corruption and provide an avenue for quick and efficient response to
international adoption crises).
254. See id. at 401-02 (noting that "prompt assessment of crises related to
international adoption may not be easily addressed within [the current] framework"
while a "small but permanent oversight body" could absolve those deficiencies).
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that the international body would be concerned with fact finding and
ongoing evaluation of whether the intercountry-adoption process is
working effectively. 255
Like the maintenance of a global fund, the creation of a
multinational agency would likely be a positive resource for the system
of intercountry adoption. Still, because corruption has tended to occur
256
and because a smaller oversight body
at the very ground level,

cannot practicably provide an effective check on every individual
adoption that takes place, a global agency does not fully respond to the
257
Additionally,
needs of the international adoption community.
uncertainties surrounding the funding and the legitimacy of such an
agency make it unlikely to succeed if individual countries are not
making their own efforts.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS TO REDUCE CORRUPTION IN INTERCOUNTRY
ADOPTION

In order to function effectively, intercountry adoption must be
regulated. As with all international conventions, the number of
possible oversight bodies is limited. In intercountry adoption, possible
monitoring entities are (a) the sending state, (b) the receiving state, (c)
an international body, and (d) a private body or network of private
bodies. It seems reasonable that states of origin maintain a significant
level of supervision in intercountry adoption because they are the
closest to possible sources of corruption. However, the devastating
patterns exemplified in Guatemala, Ethiopia, and other nations affirm
that states of origin, on their own, have not been able to hold off the
exploitation of children and families. Consequently, their supervision
258
An
should be supplemented by one of the other three bodies.

255. See id. at 403; see also Dillon, supra note 8, at 254 ("There is an urgent need
for a global agency to carry out rigorous empirical studies" on how many children need
help, how they might be helped, and "how their needs fit in with potential adoptive
families, in-country and abroad.").
256. See BLAIR ET AL., supra note 5, at 826-27 (discussing the beginnings of
corruption in Guatemala); Graff, They Steal Babies, supra note 78 (describing corruption
at the orphanage and adoption agency level in Ethiopia).
257. It is also likely that non-Hague states would object to supervision by or
participation with a global body.
258. The idea of complementing the oversight powers of a state with parallel
powers from another body is not unheard of in international law. Cf. Jeffrey L. Bleich,
Complementarity,25 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 281, 281 (1997) (introducing the idea that,
in international criminal law, states have embraced the idea of complementary
jurisdiction in criminal prosecutions for both domestic courts and the International
Criminal Court); Britta Lisa Krings, The Principlesof 'Complementarity'and Universal
Jurisdiction in International Criminal Law: Antagonists or Perfect Match?, 4
GOETTINGEN J. INT'L L. 737, 750 (2012) (suggesting that this complementary jurisdiction
serves to both "ensur[e] that State parties ... keep their sovereign right to try crimes
committed under their jurisdiction" and "actively fight against impunity by prosecuting
a higher number of perpetrators.").
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international body, while theoretically a good option, would be difficult
to fund and staff to a level that it is able to provide additional checks
and approvals concerning every aspect of the adoption process each
time. A private body would be no better. There would still be concerns
about who pays for this private monitoring, and privatization has
already led to much of the trouble in the intercountry-adoption sphere.
Few adoption proponents would endorse further removing
intercountry adoption from public scrutiny. Thus, the best option for
supplementing the supervision of states of origin is passing some of
their responsibilities to receiving states. Asking more of receiving
states is not unreasonable given that the work would be spread out
among each receiving state and the vast majority are Western states
that already possess the resources and infrastructure to provide
additional oversight.
Therefore, rather than completely modifying the process set out in
the Hague Convention or pulling the plug on intercountry adoption
altogether, receiving states should take on more responsibility in
ensuring that all intercountry adoptions reflect the principles set forth
in the Hague Convention. According to the Hague's own information
brochure, the Hague Convention allows parties to "impose higher
standards or requirements on their partner Convention State
Parties." 259 Therefore, using receiving states to provide additional
monitoring and checks seems to be perfectly permissible without
modifying the Hague Convention so long as its explicit requirements
are also being implemented. 260
To best combat corruption and exploitation: (1) receiving states
should enforce the Hague Convention principles in every intercountry
adoption; (2) receiving states should provide a secondary check on the
adoptability of a child and the legitimacy of parental consents; (3)
private agencies must maintain the continued approval and
authorization of not only the state of origin, but also the receiving state
in order to continue participating in the adoption process; and (4)
receiving states should be diligent in their postadoption
communication with states of origin.
A. Every Adoption Should Proceed Like a Hague Adoption
Although the Hague Convention has been around for more than
twenty-five years, its vision and structure have hardly been given a
chance to play out in a vast number of intercountry adoptions. Many
intercountry adoptions transpire between countries that are not both
members to the Hague Convention, and the Hague principles rarely

259.

INFORMATION BROCHURE, supra note 1, at 9.

260. See id. (listing permissible options for State Parties under the Hague
Convention).
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play out in these situations. 26 1 To avoid devastating outbursts of
corruption, receiving states must enforce the processes and principles
of the Hague Convention in all intercountry adoptions, regardless of
262
whether the state of origin is a party to the Hague Convention.
While this idea is not revolutionary, it is absolutely necessary to any
functional proposition concerning the Hague Convention or
intercountry adoptions more broadly.
The Hague's Guide No. 1 claims that the need for the Hague
Convention to apply even in non-Hague adoptions is a generally
accepted principle.2 6 3 The Special Commission has repeatedly
recommended that states which are parties to the Hague Convention
should seek to apply its standards and safeguards even in adoptions
with non-Hague states. 264 Even scholars with dramatically different
ideas about intercountry adoption have advocated that Hague
26 5
Professor Smolin cautions
principles be applied across the board.
that, if this is not done, there may develop a "two-tier system" in which
adoptions between Hague states run smoothly and agencies wishing to
26 6
The wide
avoid harsher scrutiny open up in non-Hague countries.
embrace this notion has received is evidence of its importance in ending
corruption in intercountry-adoption practices. Where countries are not
willing to adhere to the standards of the Hague Convention in their
intercountry adoptions, Hague countries should refrain from adoptions
with those countries. If non-Hague adoptions are not held to the same
standards as far as is practicably possible, then all other
recommendations are moot because there will always be a massive
backdoor for noncompliance.

261. See, e.g., Statistics, supra note 21 (displaying an interactive map that shows
the number of U.S. adoptions in each nation-both Hague and non-Hague-between
1999 and 2016).
262. In situations where the sending state is a party to the Hague Convention and
the receiving state is not, the sending state should also seek to enforce the Hague
standards in its dealings with that state. However, because the vast majority of big
receiving states are members to the convention, it seems most necessary to place the call
on receiving states. See Status Table, supra note 176 (listing contracting parties to the
convention and their ratification status regarding the convention).
263. Guide No. 1, supra note 65, at 134, para. 635.
264. See INFORMATION BROCHURE, supra note 1, at 21 ("The Special Commission
reiterated the recommendation that Contracting States, in their relations with nonContracting States, should apply as far as practicable the standards and safeguards of
the Convention.").
265. See Dillon, supra note 8, at 240 ("Access to adoption from any particular
country should be restricted to agencies willing to observe the spirit of the Hague
Convention."); Smolin, Hague Convention, supra note 64, at 497 ("Hague receiving
must apply equally vigorous regulatory and investigative approaches to
countries ...
adoptions from both Hague and non-Hague countries.").
266. Smolin, Hague Convention, supra note 64, at 497.
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B. Receiving States Should Provide a Second Check as to Whether a
Child Is Adoptable and Consents Were Properly Obtained
Rather than leaving under-resourced sending nations to confirm
alone that each child is truly adoptable and that parental consents
were properly received, receiving states should aid sending states by
monitoring and providing an additional check on these two important
pieces of information. 2 67 This is not to say that receiving states should
take over these responsibilities or that states of origin should no longer
make the initial checks themselves. Instead, in the shared interests of
processing only ethical adoptions and bolstering the legitimacy of the
international adoption system, both sending and receiving states
should embrace a secondary check by receiving states. Smolin even
goes so far to say that "[a]n interpretation of the Hague Convention
that prevents or discourages receiving nations from independently
investigating and evaluating the history and status of 'orphans' would
render the Convention itself counterproductive."
Article 39(2) of the Hague Convention expressly allows member
states to enter into agreements with each other "with a view to
improving the application of the Convention in their mutual
relations." 268 The text does limit the scope of derogation to only certain
procedural requirements after the child is deemed adoptable by the
state of origin, but a secondary check after the initial determination
may well fit within the bounds of this provision.2 6 9
This confirmation could take many forms, some requiring more%
effort on the part of receiving nations. At the very least, direct
correspondence between the agency that actually interacted with the
child's biological parents and the authorities of the receiving state
seems reasonable. If this correspondence leads to suspicion on the part
of the receiving state, it should alert the state of origin, discuss how to
proceed, and-ideally with the support of the state of origin, but
unilaterally if that is not possible-take the next appropriate step. This
could mean refusing to work with a certain agency or group of agencies
for a time or indefinitely. Another possible check would be providing
questionnaires directly to birth parents after consents have been
obtained. These questionnaires need not be overly complicated to catch
potentially fraudulent inducement of consent. A great start would
simply be asking a few questions about who the biological parents
interacted with throughout the process, what sort of agreement they
believe to have entered into, and if they were compensated or pressured
in any way before they gave their consent. The questionnaires could be
created and processed by the receiving states, and distributed and

267. In a more recent article, Professor Smolin also pointed out that it is improper
for receiving nations to rely on sending nations to do most of the legwork in rooting out
corruption and exploitation. Id. at 496.
268. Hague Convention, supra note 30, art. 39(2).
269. See id. (limiting derogation from only the provisions of Articles 14-16 and
18-21).
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collected by either the public authorities of the state of origin or those
of the receiving state.
Critics may argue that national-sovereignty concerns will keep
states of origin from embracing this idea. However, history and
experience show that developing states are willing to accept many
kinds of assistance-for example, developmental aid, technical aid, or
aid following a crisis. Additionally, any state interested in providing a
safe, moral, and legitimate adoption process should be willing to
embrace the added help. The Hague's Permanent Bureau urged, with
regard to the Hague Convention, that "[clo-operation is an ongoing
process that States need to constantly rethink and improve to avoid
misunderstanding, inconsistencies, poor co-ordination, and duplicative
efforts." 270 Further, while many of the pre-adoption proceduresincluding the "formal assessment of the child's situation"-are ideally
public procedures, the Hague Guide No. 2 acknowledges the reality
that many states of origin lack the resources to undertake all the
preadoption procedures on their own and often outsource these
27
responsibilities to nongovernmental actors. 1 Thus, rather than
directly monitoring the operation of public entities, receiving states
will more often than not be providing a second check on the actions of
private bodies, which lessens possible concerns regarding the sending
state's sovereignty. 2 72
C. Private Agencies Must Maintain the Approval of Every Major
Participantin the Adoption Process
The examples from Guatemala and Ethiopia demonstrate that the
exploitation of parents and children in intercountry adoption typically
begins with individual orphanages and adoption agencies. 2 73 it is,
therefore, incredibly important that only duly approved bodies be
allowed to operate in the intercountry-adoption process. What
continued approval looks like will naturally look different in
partnerships between two Hague states and those where only one
country is a party to the Hague Convention. Approval processes and
requirements will also vary based on whether the private agency is
functioning as an accredited body under Article 10274 or as an
unaccredited body under Article 32.275

270. 25 YEARS, supra note 59, at 16.
271. Guide No. 2, supra note 126, at 47, para. 206.
272. It also bears repeating that the authorities of the sending state do not lose
any oversight or monitoring power. The goal is increased oversight at the ground level,
and this will be best achieved by supplementing the checks of sending states not
replacing them.
273. See BLAIR ET AL., supra note 5, at 826-28 (discussing the adoption agency
corruption history in Guatemala and Ethiopia); Graff, They Steal Babies, supra note 78
(saying many agencies sent money from the U.S. to poor countries in ways that constitute
fraud).
274. Hague Convention, supra note 30, art. 10.
275. Id. art. 32.
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In relations between two states that are parties to the Hague
Convention, there are more rules in place regarding the continued
operation of private agencies. Article 12 of the Hague Convention
speaks to the necessary approval of accredited bodies to participate in
intercountry adoptions between two Hague states. 2 76 It announces that
bodies that have been accredited in one contracting state may only act
in another "if the competent authorities of both States have authorised
it to do so." 277 However, it is unclear from the text of the Hague

Convention whether this authorization refers to the initial
accreditation of a private entity or whether continuous approval is
required.27 8
Guide No. 2 suggests that authorization may differ from
accreditation. 2 79 It encourages receiving states to have separate
processes for accrediting bodies under Article 10 and authorizing them
to work in a particular state of origin under Article 12.280 It prefers
that receiving states make "an individualised assessment .

.

. of the

suitability of an accredited body to act in a particular State of
origin." 281 This seems to suggest that the Hague Conference is in favor
of receiving states having more of a say in which accredited bodies they,
work with in any given state of origin. Guide No. 2, though, states that
a state of origin may suspend or cancel the authorization of a foreign
accredited body to operate in its territory, but does not say the same
about receiving states. 28 2 Further, Guide No. 2 states that receiving
states "respect and support" the determinations of states of origin
concerning how many and which bodies are accredited to work there. 28 3
According to Article 11(c) of the convention, accredited bodies are
subject to the supervision of the competent authorities of the state of
accreditation. 284 This seems to suggest that states that have only
authorized the accredited body to act in their state or another state,
but have not actually accredited that body, lack supervisory power over
it. Further, because supervision is delegated to "competent authorities"
rather than to the central authority or "public authorities," it is
possible that the supervisory role could be delegated to a nonstate
actor. 285 Indeed, Guide No. 2 encourages, but does not require, states
to retain control of the supervision functions. 286

276. Id. art. 12.
277. Id. (emphasis added).
278. See id. (referring only to "a body accredited in one Contracting State")
279. See Guide No. 2, supra note 126, at 43, para. 176 (noting a degree of
separation between Article 10 accreditation and Article 12 authorization).
280. Id.
281. Id. at 43, para. 177.
282. Id. at 64, para. 290.
283. Id. at 43, para. 178.
284. Hague Convention, supra note 30, art. 11(c).
285. See id. (saying an accredited body shall be "subject to supervision by
competent authorities of that State").
286. See Guide No. 2, supra note 126, at 64, para. 285 (listing certain good
practices that states are encouraged to implement).
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This confusing and fragmentary web of authorization and
supervision is not enough to meet the needs of the intercountryadoption community. For the best chance at catching corruption early
on, either the sending or receiving state should have the power to (a)
unauthorize or denounce the accreditation of any accredited body
unilaterally, and (b) supervise the accredited bodies acting in their
partner states. Some will argue that this is what the text of the Hague
Convention and Guide No. 2 already require. Others may say that this
is adding something to Guide No. 2 or the text. Regardless, it is
necessary and helpful to specifically bring this point to the attention of
both sending and receiving states. Because corruption has consistently
taken place at the ground level of orphanages and private actors, the
accredited bodies should be subject to as much supervision as possible
given the available resources. Receiving states should leverage their
administrative resources and supplement the monitoring that states of
origin are already doing.2 8 7 For this additional supervision to be of any
use, both the sending and receiving states must have the ability to stop
working with any private body when one of them becomes concerned
that unethical practices are occurring-regardless of whether that
body has been previously accredited and authorized to act in a
particular state and which state actually accredited the body.
The Hague Convention does not speak to whether both countries'
approval is required for nonaccredited bodies certified under Article
22.288 The text only specifies that a contracting state may declare that
an unaccredited body is permitted to take on some of the procedural
requirements in the intercountry-adoption process so long as that body
289
For
meets the professional and ethical requirements of that state.
maximum effectiveness in rooting out fraud, these unaccredited bodies
should be subject to the same supervision and authorization standards
as accredited bodies. That is, either the sending or the receiving state
should be able to unilaterally refuse working with that body in the
intercountry-adoption process at any time.
In non-Hague countries, the authorization and supervision of
private agencies will have to look different. Because accreditation and
other approval procedures are sourced from the Hague Convention,
these procedures will only exist in non-Hague countries to the extent
that the domestic laws and regulations of that country require them.
To enforce the same supervisory and continued approval requirements
in non-Hague states, receiving states may need to enact legislation
specifically addressing this. In 2012, the United States did just this
29 0
with its Intercountry Adoption Universal Accreditation Act (UAA).

287. Some of the supervision could involve communicating with adoptive parents
who can be great source of information about the operation of non-public actors. Guide
No. 2 suggests that adoptive parents help "supervise" accredited bodies by providing
feedback on the services provided throughout the adoption. See id. at 65, para. 291.
288. See Hague Convention, supra note 30, art. 22.
289. Id.
290. Intercountry Adoption Universal Accreditation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No.
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The UAA amended the United States' Intercountry Adoption Act of
2000 to require that the provisions concerning accreditation of
nonpublic entities in Hague Convention adoptions apply with equal
force to non-Hague adoptions. 291 Although the UAA went into effect
relatively late into Ethiopia's adoption crisis, there is some evidence
that it had a positive effect in shutting down unethical adoption
agencies. Journalist E.J. Graff suggested that "[w]hen that law came
into effect, the adoption agencies that most troubled the U.S. Embassy
in Addis Ababa shut their doors and went out of business." 292 Other
receiving states should follow suit and pass laws requiring Hague
Convention accreditation standards in non-Hague adoptions. NonHague states of origin may not like this move on the part of receiving
states, but they will have to live with its effects if they want to
participate in intercountry adoptions with Hague countries.
D. GreaterTransparencyand Follow-up Reporting by Receiving States
Finally, to alleviate the concerns of sending countries like
Ethiopia who want to know that their nation's children are being well
looked after in their new homes, receiving states should take care to
comply to the greatest extent possible with the postadoption reporting
requests and requirements of sending states. Engaging in follow-up
meetings with adoptive parents or at least requiring adoptive parents
or social workers to respond to surveys about the status of the adoption
would increase transparency from receiving states to sending states.
Another possibility for greater transparency would be permitting, but
not requiring, states of origin to conduct a similar "second check" on
the approval of prospective adoptive parents before the adoption
occurs. That way, concerned countries could to choose to investigate
further without demanding more of states of origin that feel they do
not have the desire or resources to conduct such a check.
Article 20 of the Hague Convention briefly mentions that
respective central authorities should keep each other informed about
the progress of the placement "if a probationary period is required." 293
However, ratifying countries are permitted to do more than Article 20
requires, 294 so adding to the postadoption reporting requirements of
receiving states fits comfortably within the text of the Hague
Convention.
Additionally, at a meeting of the Hague Special Commission in
June 2010, the commission recommended that receiving states comply

112-276, § 2, 126 Stat. 2466 (2013).
291. Id.
292. Graff, They Steal Babies, supra note 78.
293. Hague Convention, supra note 30, art. 20.
294. See id. art. 39(2) (allowing parties to enter into additional agreements "with
a view to improving the application of the Convention in their mutual relations" and
expressly allowing derogations from Article 20).

726

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 52:685

295
The
with the postadoption reporting requirements of sending states.
Special Commission also requested that the Hague's Permanent
Bureau, together with parties to the convention and other
nongovernmental organizations, assemble information regarding the
"selection, counselling and preparation of prospective adoptive
parents" for the possible development of a Guide to Good Practice No.
3.296 If the Special Commission proceeds with this project, the new
guide could also be a resource for receiving states seeking ways to best
handle postadoption procedures and communication.

VI. CONCLUSION
While intercountry adoption has, at times, been the setting of
devastating corruption, concerned individuals should not abandon
hope. Accounts of what happened in countries like Guatemala and
Ethiopia are disheartening, but they also give insight into the form and
causes of corruption in the intercountry-adoption system. Further, the
Hague Convention gives policymakers a great starting point for better
regulating international adoptions. Because of the unequal
distribution of responsibilities and resources between sending and
receiving countries under the Hague Convention and the significant
role that private bodies are permitted to play in the adoption process,
the ideals of the Hague Convention are not being realized in many
adoptions.
However, allowing and encouraging receiving states to leverage
their greater financial and administrative resources in the
intercountry-adoption context can remedy these and other concerns.
Specifically, receiving states should be called upon to (a) apply the
principles of the Hague Convention to all intercountry adoptions, (b)
offer a second check on the adoptability of a child and necessary
consents of biological parents, (c) provide additional supervision of
private actors, and (d) give detailed and timely follow-up reports on the
statuses of completed adoptions. These measures will help the
standards of the Hague Convention to be better realized in the
intercountry-adoption sphere.
JordanBunn*

295. See INFORMATION BROCHURE, supra note 1, at 20 (indicating also that it may
develop a model form to aid receiving states in this endeavor). The Special Commission
also recommended that states of origin which are members to the Hague Convention
limit the period of required post-adoption reporting by receiving states. Id.
296. See id. at 17 (noting that Guide No. 3 might specifically address (1) dealing
with failed adoptions, and (2) the period of validity of home study reports).
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